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Noisy Introspection in the 11–20 Game

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  • Jacob K. Goeree
  • Philippos Louis
  • Jingjing Zhang

Abstract

Previous experiments based on the 11–20 game have produced evidence for the level†k model with observed levels of strategic thinking consistently ranging from 0 to 3. Our baseline treatment uses the 11–20 game and replicates previous results. We apply four models of strategic thinking to the baseline†treatment data and use these to predict behaviour and beliefs in five other treatments that employ games with a very similar structure. The best predictive performance is achieved by models that incorporate ‘common knowledge of noise’. A model of noisy introspection, which does so, predicts behaviour remarkably well.

Suggested Citation

  • Jacob K. Goeree & Philippos Louis & Jingjing Zhang, 2018. "Noisy Introspection in the 11–20 Game," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 128(611), pages 1509-1530, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:econjl:v:128:y:2018:i:611:p:1509-1530
    DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12479
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    Cited by:

    1. Hanaki, Nobuyuki & Koriyama, Yukio & Sutan, Angela & Willinger, Marc, 2019. "The strategic environment effect in beauty contest games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 587-610.
    2. Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Johannes Buckenmaier, 2021. "Cognitive sophistication and deliberation times," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 24(2), pages 558-592, June.
    3. King King Li & Kang Rong, 2018. "Choices in the 11–20 Game: The Role of Risk Aversion," Games, MDPI, vol. 9(3), pages 1-14, July.
    4. Jacob K. Goeree & Philippos Louis, 2021. "M Equilibrium: A Theory of Beliefs and Choices in Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 111(12), pages 4002-4045, December.
    5. Choo, Lawrence C.Y & Kaplan, Todd R., 2014. "Explaining Behavior in the "11-20" Game," MPRA Paper 52808, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Irenaeus Wolff, 2023. "Heuristic Centered-Belief Players," TWI Research Paper Series 128, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz.
    7. Feng, Jun & Qin, Xiangdong & Wang, Xiaoyuan, 2021. "A Bayesian cognitive hierarchy model with fixed reasoning levels," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 192(C), pages 704-723.

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