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A note on securities market response to pension fund termination

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  • H. FRED MITTELSTAEDT
  • PHILIP R. REGIER

Abstract

. A recent article in this journal (Hsieh, Ferris, and Chen, 1990) presents evidence demonstrating that financially distressed firms that terminate overfunded pension plans experience significantly positive abnormal returns, while nondistressed terminating firms experience returns not different from zero. The article concludes from this evidence that the market regards the property rights to excess assets as residing fully with the sponsoring firm prior to termination, particularly when the sponsoring firm is not financially distressed. Accordingly, the reporting requirements of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 88, which require immediate recognition of gains resulting from termination, are inconsistent with the market's view of the ownership rights to excess plan assets. Similarly, the article suggests that the excise tax imposed on asset reversions is “punitive†because property rights to fund assets resided with the company prior to termination. This paper questions three aspects of the Hsieh, Ferris, and Chen article: (1) the plausibility of the theory explaining differential reaction to the announcement to terminate for distressed and nondistressed firms; (2) the effect of the distressed/nondistressed classification criteria, event date specification, and event window length on the results; and (3) the appropriateness of using the empirical results, if reliable, to evaluate accounting treatment or federal tax policy. Résumé. Dans un récent article paru dans cette même publication, Hsieh, Ferris et Chen (1990) soumettaient des faits démontrant que les entreprises en difficulté financière qui mettent fin à un régime de retraite surprovisionné enregistrent des rendements anormaux positifs importants, tandis que les entreprises qui mettent fin à un régime de retraite sans être en difficulté financière enregistrent des rendements qui ne sont pas différents de zéro. De là , les auteurs concluaient que le marché estime que les droits à l'excédent d'actif appartiennent exclusivement à l'entreprise responsable du régime avant la cessation, en particulier lorsque cette dernière n'est pas en difficulté financière. Par conséquent, les exigences de la norme SFAS No. 88 en matière d'information à fournir, qui prévoient la constatation immédiate du produit de la cessation du régime, ne sont pas conformes à la façon de voir du marché relativement aux droits à l'excédent d'actif du régime. De la même façon, selon les auteurs, la taxe d'accise imposée en cas de retour de l'actif est “punitive†, étant donné que les droits à l'actif du régime appartenaient à l'entreprise avant la cessation du régime. Les auteurs s'interrogent ici sur trois aspects de l'article de Hsieh, Ferris, et Chen: 1) la pertinence de la théorie expliquant la réaction marginale à l'annonce de la cessation d'un régime pour les entreprise qui sont en difficulté financière et celles qui ne le sont pas; 2) l'incidence sur les résultats des critères permettant de classer les entreprises comme étant en difficulté financière ou ne l‘étant pas, de la précision de la date de l’événement et de la longueur de la période pré†post relative à l‘événement; et 3) l'opportunité de l'utilisation des résultats empiriques, s'ils sont fiables, pour évaluer le traitement comptable ou la politique fiscale fédérale.

Suggested Citation

  • H. Fred Mittelstaedt & Philip R. Regier, 1991. "A note on securities market response to pension fund termination," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 8(1), pages 82-93, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:coacre:v:8:y:1991:i:1:p:82-93
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1911-3846.1991.tb00835.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Oldfield, George S, Jr, 1977. "Financial Aspects of the Private Pension System," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 9(1), pages 48-54, February.
    2. Alderson, Michael J & Chen, K C, 1986. "Excess Asset Reversions and Shareholder Wealth," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 41(1), pages 225-241, March.
    3. Stone, M, 1987. "A Financing Explanation For Overfunded Pension Plan Terminations," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(2), pages 317-326.
    4. Su†Jane Hsieh & Kenneth R. Ferris & Andrew H. Chen, 1990. "Securities market response to pension fund termination," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 6(2), pages 550-572, March.
    5. Mittelstaedt, H. Fred, 1989. "An empirical analysis of the factors underlying the decision to remove excess assets from overfunded pension plans," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 399-418, November.
    6. Wayne R. Landsman & James A. Ohlson, 1990. "Evaluation of market efficiency for supplementary accounting disclosures: The case of pension assets and liabilities," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 7(1), pages 185-198, September.
    7. Feldstein, Martin & Seligman, Stephanie, 1981. "Pension Funding, Share Prices, and National Savings," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 36(4), pages 801-824, September.
    8. In-Mu Haw & William Ruland & Ahmed Hamdallah, 1988. "Investor Evaluation Of Overfunded Pension Plan Terminations," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 11(1), pages 81-88, March.
    9. Thomas, Jacob K., 1989. "Why do firms terminate their overfunded pension plans?," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 361-398, November.
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