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Credit Ratings and CEO Risk‐Taking Incentives

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  • Yu Flora Kuang
  • Bo Qin

Abstract

This study examines the sophistication of rating agencies in incorporating managerial risk‐taking incentives into their credit risk evaluation. We measure risk‐taking incentives using two proxies: the sensitivity of managerial wealth to stock return volatility (vega) and the sensitivity of managerial wealth to stock price (delta). We find that rating agencies impound managerial risk‐taking incentives in their credit risk assessments. Assuming other things equal, a one standard deviation increase in vega (delta) will lead to an approximately one‐notch (two‐notch) rating downgrade. In addition, we evaluate the significance of credit ratings in the design of CEO compensation. Our findings suggest that rating‐troubled firms will gear down managerial incentives of risk seeking. In particular, other things equal, a rating downgrade to the lower edge of the investment category (i.e., BBB−) in the immediate prior year will bring about an approximately 51 percent reduction of vega incentive from options newly granted to the CEO in the current year. However, we find no evidence that firms' rating concerns significantly affect delta. Given the significance of credit ratings in the marketplace and their close connection to accounting, the findings of the current study advance our understanding, not only of how sophisticated rating agencies are in incorporating forward‐looking information (i.e., vega and delta) into risk assessments, but of how influential the raters are in changing firms' compensation policies. The findings also have implications on the role of accounting in constraining excessive managerial risk taking with improved disclosures on managerial compensation.

Suggested Citation

  • Yu Flora Kuang & Bo Qin, 2013. "Credit Ratings and CEO Risk‐Taking Incentives," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 30(4), pages 1524-1559, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:coacre:v:30:y:2013:i:4:p:1524-1559
    DOI: 10.1111/1911-3846.12005
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lawrence J. White, 2007. "A New Law for the Bond Rating Industry-- For Better or For Worse?," Working Papers 07-4, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
    2. Kabir, Rezaul & Li, Hao & Veld-Merkoulova, Yulia V., 2013. "Executive compensation and the cost of debt," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(8), pages 2893-2907.
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    Cited by:

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    3. Chen, Jie & Su, Xunhua & Tian, Xuan & Xu, Bin, 2022. "Does customer-base structure influence managerial risk-taking incentives?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 462-483.
    4. Hossain, Ashrafee & Hossain, Takdir & Jha, Anand & Mougoué, Mbodja, 2023. "Credit ratings and social capital," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
    5. Acheampong, Albert & Elshandidy, Tamer, 2021. "Does soft information determine credit risk? Text-based evidence from European banks," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
    6. Romero, Jorge A., 2022. "Lobbying and political expenses: Complements or substitutes?," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 558-575.
    7. Agoraki, Maria-Eleni & Gounopoulos, Dimitrios & Kouretas, Georgios P., 2021. "Market expectations and the impact of credit rating on the IPOs of U.S. banks," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 189(C), pages 587-610.
    8. Hasan, Mostafa Monzur & Hossain, Ashrafee & Hossain, Takdir, 2023. "CEO inside debt holdings and credit ratings," Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(1).
    9. Liu, Claire & Masulis, Ronald W. & Stanfield, Jared, 2021. "Why CEO option compensation can be a bad option for shareholders: Evidence from major customer relationships," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 142(1), pages 453-481.
    10. Ahmed A. Elamer & Collins G. Ntim & Hussein A. Abdou & Andrews Owusu & Mohamed Elmagrhi & Awad Elsayed Awad Ibrahim, 2021. "Are bank risk disclosures informative? Evidence from debt markets," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(1), pages 1270-1298, January.
    11. Lee, Sang Mook & Jiraporn, Pornsit & Kim, Young Sang & Park, Keun Jae, 2021. "Do co-opted directors influence corporate risk-taking and credit ratings?," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 330-344.
    12. Grassa, Rihab & Moumen, Nejia & Hussainey, Khaled, 2020. "Is bank creditworthiness associated with risk disclosure behavior? Evidence from Islamic and conventional banks in emerging countries," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 61(C).
    13. Manh Cuong Nguyen & Viet Anh Dang & Tri Tri Nguyen, 2023. "The transfer of risk taking along the supply chain," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 61(4), pages 1341-1378, November.
    14. Lorenzo Casavecchia & Ja Young Suh, 2017. "Managerial incentives for risk-taking and internal capital allocation," Australian Journal of Management, Australian School of Business, vol. 42(3), pages 428-461, August.
    15. Park, June Woo & Nam, Giseok & Tsang, Albert & Lee, Yung-Jae, 2022. "Firstborn CEOs and credit ratings," The British Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(4).
    16. Bao, Xin & Sun, Baiqing & Han, Meini & Lin, Han & Lau, Raymond Y.K., 2023. "Quantifying the impact of CEO social media celebrity status on firm value: Novel measures from digital gatekeeping theory," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 189(C).

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