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Rebates as incentives to exclusivity

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  • Can Erutku

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  • Can Erutku, 2006. "Rebates as incentives to exclusivity," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 39(2), pages 477-492, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:canjec:v:39:y:2006:i:2:p:477-492
    DOI: 10.1111/j.0008-4085.2006.00356.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1998. "Exclusive Dealing," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(1), pages 64-103, February.
    2. Shaffer, Greg, 1991. "Capturing Strategic Rent: Full-Line Forcing, Brand Discounts, Aggregate Rebates, and Maximum Resale Price Maintenance," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(5), pages 557-575, September.
    3. Aghion, Philippe & Bolton, Patrick, 1987. "Contracts as a Barrier to Entry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 388-401, June.
    4. Preston R. Fee & Hugo M. Mialon & Michael A. Williams, 2004. "What Is a Barrier to Entry?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(2), pages 461-465, May.
    5. Daniel P. O'Brien & Greg Shaffer, 1997. "Nonlinear Supply Contracts, Exclusive Dealing, and Equilibrium Market Foreclosure," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(4), pages 755-785, December.
    6. Mathewson, G Frank & Winter, Ralph A, 1987. "The Competitive Effects of Vertical Agreements: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 1057-1062, December.
    7. Stefanadis, Christodoulos, 1998. "Selective Contracts, Foreclosure, and the Chicago School View," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(2), pages 429-450, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Aggey Semenov & Julian Wright, 2011. "Entry deterrrence via renegotiation-proof non-exclusive contracts," Working Papers 1105E, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.
    2. Arcelus, F.J. & Kumar, Satyendra & Srinivasan, G., 2012. "The effectiveness of manufacturer vs. retailer rebates within a newsvendor framework," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 219(2), pages 252-263.
    3. Aggey Semenov & Julian Wright, 2014. "Exclusion via Non‐Exclusive Contracts," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 47(1), pages 325-347, February.
    4. Janusz Ordover & Greg Shaffer, 2007. "Exclusionary Discounts," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2007-13, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    5. Greer, Katja, 2013. "Limiting rival's efficiency via conditional discounts," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79730, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    6. Katja Greer, 2013. "Limiting rival's efficiency via conditional discounts," Working Papers 132, Bavarian Graduate Program in Economics (BGPE).

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