Lobbying, multisector trade, and sustainability of free‐trade agreements
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DOI: 10.1111/j.0008-4085.2004.00260.x
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- Larry Qiu, 2004. "Lobbying, multisector trade, and sustainability of free-trade agreements," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 37(4), pages 1061-1083, November.
References listed on IDEAS
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Larry D. Qiu, 2008. "Endogenous Lobbying Positions," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(4), pages 641-653, September.
- Toke S. Aidt & Uk Hwang, 2014.
"To Ban or Not to Ban: Foreign Lobbying and Cross-National Externalities,"
Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 47(1), pages 272-297, February.
- Toke S. Aidt & Uk Hwang, 2014. "To Ban or Not to Ban: Foreign Lobbying and Cross‐National Externalities," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 47(1), pages 272-297, February.
- Toke Aidt & Uk Hwang, 2014. "To Ban or Not to Ban: Foreign Lobbying and Cross National Externalities," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1402, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Cai Dapeng & Li Jie, 2014. "Subsidization And Bargaining In Mixed Oligopolies," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(4), pages 358-373, October.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
- F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
- F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
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