IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/wly/canjec/v36y2003i1p168-191.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Rationalized subjective equilibria in repeated games

Author

Listed:
  • Oishi Hidetsugu

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to provide a new equilibrium concept of repeated games that involve incomplete information (rationalized subjective equilibrium) and a related framework (subjective game), and to analyse the relationships between players’ subjective images of games and the realized outcomes. We demonstrate the relationships among rationalized subjective equilibria, subjective equilibria, and original Nash equilibria by providing several examples. We also present several theorems analogous to the ordinary folk theorem and a simple application using the Cournot duopoly model. JEL Classification: C70, C72 Equilibres subjectifs rationalisés dans des jeux répétés L’objectif de cet article est de proposer un nouveau concept d’équilibre dans les jeux répétés où l’information est incomplète (équilibre subjectif rationalisé) et un cadre d’analyse approprié( jeu subjectif ), ainsi que d’analyser les rapports entre les images subjectives que les acteurs ont des jeux et de leurs résultats. On montre les rapports entre équilibres subjectifs rationalisés, équilibres subjectifs, et équilibres à la Nash à l’aide de divers exemples. On présente aussi plusieurs théorèmes analogues au « ordinary folk theorem » et une application simple utilisant le modèle de duopole de Cournot.

Suggested Citation

  • Oishi Hidetsugu, 2003. "Rationalized subjective equilibria in repeated games," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 36(1), pages 168-191, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:canjec:v:36:y:2003:i:1:p:168-191
    DOI: 10.1111/1540-5982.00009
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-5982.00009
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/1540-5982.00009?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1998. "Learning in games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 631-639, May.
    2. Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud, 1995. "Subjective games and equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 123-163.
    3. Sorin, Sylvain, 1992. "Repeated games with complete information," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 4, pages 71-107, Elsevier.
    4. Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud, 1993. "Subjective Equilibrium in Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1231-1240, September.
    5. Abreu, Dilip, 1986. "Extremal equilibria of oligopolistic supergames," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 191-225, June.
    6. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1998. "The Theory of Learning in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061945, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Yoo, Seung Han, 2014. "Learning a population distribution," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 188-201.
    2. Mario Gilli, 2002. "Rational Learning in Imperfect Monitoring Games," Working Papers 46, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2002.
    3. Sobel, Joel, 2000. "Economists' Models of Learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 94(2), pages 241-261, October.
    4. John H. Nachbar, 2005. "Beliefs in Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(2), pages 459-480, March.
    5. Rui J. P. de Figueiredo Jr. & Jack Rakove & Barry R. Weingast, 2006. "Rationality, Inaccurate Mental Models, and Self-confirming Equilibrium," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 18(4), pages 384-415, October.
    6. Scott E. Page, 2008. "Uncertainty, Difficulty, and Complexity," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 20(2), pages 115-149, April.
    7. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Simone Cerreia-Vioglio & Fabio Maccheroni & Massimo Marinacci, 2015. "Self-Confirming Equilibrium and Model Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(2), pages 646-677, February.
    8. Alexander Smajgl, 2007. "Modelling evolving rules for the use of common-pool resources in an agent-based model," Interdisciplinary Description of Complex Systems - scientific journal, Croatian Interdisciplinary Society Provider Homepage: http://indecs.eu, vol. 5(2), pages 56-80.
    9. Schipper, Burkhard C., 2021. "Discovery and equilibrium in games with unawareness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
    10. Lehrer, Ehud & Teper, Roee, 2011. "Justifiable preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(2), pages 762-774, March.
    11. Atanasios Mitropoulos, 2001. "Learning Under Little Information: An Experiment on Mutual Fate Control," Game Theory and Information 0110003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Simone Cerreia-Vioglio & Fabio Maccheroni & Massimo Marinacci, 2011. "Selfconfirming Equilibrium and Uncertainty," Working Papers 428, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    13. Battigalli, P. & Francetich, A. & Lanzani, G. & Marinacci, M., 2019. "Learning and self-confirming long-run biases," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 740-785.
    14. Alexander Smajgl, 2004. "Modelling the effect of learning and evolving rules on the use of common-pool resources," Computing in Economics and Finance 2004 178, Society for Computational Economics.
    15. Eric Friedman & Scott Shenker, 1998. "Learning and Implementation on the Internet," Departmental Working Papers 199821, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
    16. Galbiati, Marco & Soramäki, Kimmo, 2011. "An agent-based model of payment systems," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 35(6), pages 859-875, June.
    17. Ianni, A., 2002. "Reinforcement learning and the power law of practice: some analytical results," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 203, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
    18. ,, 2011. "Manipulative auction design," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 6(2), May.
    19. Benaïm, Michel & Hofbauer, Josef & Hopkins, Ed, 2009. "Learning in games with unstable equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1694-1709, July.
    20. Dieter Balkenborg & Rosemarie Nagel, 2016. "An Experiment on Forward vs. Backward Induction: How Fairness and Level k Reasoning Matter," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 17(3), pages 378-408, August.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wly:canjec:v:36:y:2003:i:1:p:168-191. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://doi.org/10.1111/(ISSN)1540-5982 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.