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Nexus between government surveillance on executive compensation and green innovation: Evidence from the type of state‐owned enterprises

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  • Qian Li
  • Umer Sahil Maqsood
  • R. M. Ammar Zahid

Abstract

The Chinese government capped executive compensation in state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) to address income inequality and promote a more equitable distribution of wealth. This study investigates whether regulating top executives' pay alters their motivation for corporate green innovation (GI) initiatives. Using data from 2006 to 2018 for Chinese‐listed SOEs, the regression analysis and difference‐in‐difference methods revealed that government restrictions on executive compensation negatively affect GI. Furthermore, the types of SOE results show that the negative effect of pay restrictions on GI exists only in local SOEs, as opposed to central SOEs. Moreover, high managerial shareholding positively moderates this negative effect, demonstrating that the adverse effects of compensation restrictions are mitigated by the convergence of interests between managers and stakeholders. These findings are robust to instrumental variables and other robustness tests. This study provides policy recommendations for the government to boost its assistance in GI and establish new environment‐related incentives that motivate managers to promote GI and inspire enterprises to deploy sustainable environmental initiatives.

Suggested Citation

  • Qian Li & Umer Sahil Maqsood & R. M. Ammar Zahid, 2024. "Nexus between government surveillance on executive compensation and green innovation: Evidence from the type of state‐owned enterprises," Business Ethics, the Environment & Responsibility, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 33(1), pages 94-112, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:buseth:v:33:y:2024:i:1:p:94-112
    DOI: 10.1111/beer.12601
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