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Valence and Campaigns

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  • Jennifer Carter
  • John W. Patty

Abstract

We present a model of two‐candidate elections in which candidates are office‐motivated, campaigning is voluntary and costly, and one candidate has a valence advantage. In equilibrium, the order of campaign announcements matters: Each candidate would prefer to announce his or her position after the other candidate has announced his or hers. The fundamental predictions of the model are (1) the impact of valence and campaigning costs on candidates' equilibrium behaviors is in general ambiguous, requiring further specification of the details of the electoral situation, and (2) in general, equilibrium platform announcements are essentially independent of the location of the median voter's ideal point. In addition, the model is consistent with elections in which both, only one, or neither candidate actively campaigns, and, finally, even when one candidate has a large valence advantage, there might be no equilibrium in which he or she will win the election with certainty.

Suggested Citation

  • Jennifer Carter & John W. Patty, 2015. "Valence and Campaigns," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 59(4), pages 825-840, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:59:y:2015:i:4:p:825-840
    DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12136
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    Cited by:

    1. Daniel Cardona & Jenny Freitas & Antoni Rubí-Barceló, 2023. "Polarization and conflict among groups with heterogeneous members," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 61(1), pages 199-219, July.
    2. Livio Di Lonardo, 2017. "Valence uncertainty and the nature of the candidate pool in elections," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 29(2), pages 327-350, April.
    3. Gilles Serra, 2018. "The electoral strategies of a populist candidate: Does charisma discourage experience and encourage extremism?," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 30(1), pages 45-73, January.
    4. Alexander, Dan, 2021. "Uncontested incumbents and incumbent upsets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 163-185.
    5. Tinghua Yu & Elliott Ash, 2021. "Polarization and Political Selection," BCAM Working Papers 2105, Birkbeck Centre for Applied Macroeconomics.
    6. Enriqueta Aragonès & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2022. "Ideological Consistency and Valence," Working Papers 1383, Barcelona School of Economics.
    7. Daniel Cardona & Jenny De Freitas & Antoni Rubí-Barceló, 2018. "Polarization or Moderation? Intra-group heterogeneity in endogenous-policy contest," DEA Working Papers 87, Universitat de les Illes Balears, Departament d'Economía Aplicada.

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