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Responsibility Attribution for Collective Decision Makers

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  • Raymond Duch
  • Wojtek Przepiorka
  • Randolph Stevenson

Abstract

We argue that individuals use responsibility attribution heuristics that apply to collective decisions made, for example, by families, teams within firms, boards in international organizations, or coalition governments. We conduct laboratory and online experiments to tease out the heuristics subjects use in their responsibility attribution for collective decision makers. The lab experiments comprise a collective dictator game in which decision makers have weighted votes and recipients can punish individual decision makers. Our results show that recipients punish unfair allocations and mainly target the decision maker with proposal power and with the largest vote share. We find weak evidence that decision makers with veto power are targeted or that recipients punish proportional to vote share. The online experiment demonstrates that subjects indeed believe that the decision maker with proposal power has the most influence on the collective decision outcome. We discuss the implications of our findings for theories of vote choice.

Suggested Citation

  • Raymond Duch & Wojtek Przepiorka & Randolph Stevenson, 2015. "Responsibility Attribution for Collective Decision Makers," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 59(2), pages 372-389, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:59:y:2015:i:2:p:372-389
    DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12140
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    Cited by:

    1. Urs Fischbacher & Simeon Schudy, 2020. "Agenda Control And Reciprocity In Sequential Voting Decisions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 58(4), pages 1813-1829, October.
    2. Deepti Bhatia & Urs Fischbacher & Jan Hausfeld & Regina Stumpf, 2024. "Blame and praise: responsibility attribution patterns in decision chains," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 27(3), pages 637-663, July.
    3. Maaser, Nicola & Stratmann, Thomas, 2024. "Costly voting in weighted committees: The case of moral costs," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 162(C).
    4. Bigoni, Maria & Bortolotti, Stefania & Nas Özen, Efşan, 2021. "Economic polarization and antisocial behavior: An experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 387-401.
    5. Ali Akarca, 2018. "Political Determinants of Government Structure and Economic Performance in Turkey since 1950," Working Papers 1241, Economic Research Forum, revised 23 Oct 2018.
    6. Thomas Jensen & Andreas Madum, 2014. "Partisan Optimism and Political Bargaining," Discussion Papers 14-05, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    7. Thomas Jensen & Andreas Madum, 2017. "Partisan optimism and political bargaining," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 29(2), pages 191-213, April.
    8. Bolle, Friedel, 2017. "Passing the Buck On the acceptance of responsibility," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 86-101.

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