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Presidents and Patronage

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Listed:
  • Gary E. Hollibaugh
  • Gabriel Horton
  • David E. Lewis

Abstract

To what extent do presidents select appointees based upon campaign experience and connections? The answer to this question has important implications for our understanding of presidential management and political leadership. This article presents a theory explaining where presidents place different types of appointees and why, focusing on differences in ideology, competence, and non‐policy patronage benefits among potential appointees. We develop a formal model and test its implications with new data on 1,307 persons appointed in the first six months of the Obama administration. The empirical results broadly support the theory, suggesting that President Obama was more likely to place appointees selected for non‐policy patronage reasons in agencies off his agenda, in agencies that shared his policy views, and where appointees are least able to affect agency performance. We conclude that patronage continues to play an important role in American politics, with important consequences for campaigns, presidential politics, and governance.

Suggested Citation

  • Gary E. Hollibaugh & Gabriel Horton & David E. Lewis, 2014. "Presidents and Patronage," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 58(4), pages 1024-1042, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:58:y:2014:i:4:p:1024-1042
    DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12083
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Gary E Hollibaugh Jr, 2015. "Vacancies, vetting, and votes: A unified dynamic model of the appointments process," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 27(2), pages 206-236, April.
    2. Callen, Michael & Gulzar, Saad & Hasanain, Ali & Khan, Muhammad Yasir & Rezaee, Arman, 2023. "The political economy of public sector absence," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 218(C).
    3. Magnus Lundgren & Kseniya Oksamytna & Vincenzo Bove, 2022. "Politics or Performance? Leadership Accountability in UN Peacekeeping," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 66(1), pages 32-60, January.
    4. Min-Seok Pang, 2017. "Politics and Information Technology Investments in the U.S. Federal Government in 2003–2016," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 28(1), pages 33-45, March.
    5. Lee Epstein & Eric A. Posner, 2016. "Supreme Court Justices' Loyalty to the President," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 45(2), pages 401-436.

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