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Agency relationships in the farm credit system: The role of the farm credit banks

Author

Listed:
  • Peter J. Barry

    (Agricultural Finance and Agricultural Law and Finance, University of Illions)

  • John R. Brake

    (Agricultural Finance, Cornell University)

  • Delmar K. Banner

    (Agricultural Finance and Agricultural Law and Finance, University of Illions)

Abstract

This article uses agency concepts from modern business and finance theory to evaluate how the significant restructuring of the Farm Credit System, resulting from legislative enactments of the 1980s together with market, institutional, and technological factors, has changed the role of the farm credit banks in controlling the System's agency costs. The intermediation and service roles of the farm credit banks are evaluated in light of the glowing size and stronger lending capacities of the System's lending associations, and other recent developments. Policy implications for the future structure of the Farm Credit System also are considered. © 1993 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Suggested Citation

  • Peter J. Barry & John R. Brake & Delmar K. Banner, 1993. "Agency relationships in the farm credit system: The role of the farm credit banks," Agribusiness, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 9(3), pages 233-245.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:agribz:v:9:y:1993:i:3:p:233-245
    DOI: 10.1002/1520-6297(199305)9:3<233::AID-AGR2720090305>3.0.CO;2-I
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hart, Oliver D, 1988. "Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(1), pages 119-139, Spring.
    2. Kane, Edward J, 1990. "Principal-Agent Problems in S&L Salvage," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(3), pages 755-764, July.
    3. David A. Lins & Peter J. Barry, 1984. "Agency Status for the Cooperative Farm Credit System," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 66(5), pages 601-606.
    4. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    5. Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1985. "Credit Markets and the Control of Capital," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 17(2), pages 133-152, May.
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