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Canadian Evidence of Adherence to “Comply or Explain” Corporate Governance Codes: An International Comparison

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  • Steven E. Salterio
  • Joan E. D. Conrod
  • Regan N. Schmidt

Abstract

This study documents the rate of compliance by Canadian public firms with corporate governance recommendations imposed by the Canadian Securities Administrators. Canada uses a “comply or explain” governance structure in which harmonized provincial regulation establishes mandatory disclosure of governance practices. Firms can be compliant with these requirements either by voluntarily adopting the recommended best practices (i.e., adopt) or by explaining the alternative practices implemented to achieve the same governance principle (i.e., explain). Firms that fail to comply (i.e., neither adopt nor explain) are in violation of Canadian securities regulation with respect to governance. Using a hand‐collected sample of 742 Canadian public companies and 16 governance recommendations, our results show that an average of 82 percent of firms complied by adopting the best practice and an additional 4 percent complied by explanation. Our study also shows that 39 percent of Canadian publicly traded firms were completely compliant with all 16 recommendations examined in this study, either by adoption or explanation. To provide a broader context for these results, we compare rates of compliance in Canada to rates in Australia, a country broadly similar to Canada with comparable governance recommendations. The Australian Securities Exchange supplied data sample of 1334 Australian companies reports a complete compliance rate of 74 percent compared to Canada's 39 percent complete compliance rate. Our analysis shows that compliance by adoption of best practice is more common in Canada, whereas compliance by explanation is more common in Australia. In our analysis of compliance with individual recommendations, we find that half of the recommendations are more likely to be complied with in Australia, and the other half are more likely to be complied with in Canada. Résumé Les auteurs s'intéressent au taux de conformité des sociétés ouvertes canadiennes aux recommandations des Autorités canadiennes en valeurs mobilières, en matière de gouvernance d'entreprise. Le Canada a adopté la structure de gouvernance selon laquelle les sociétés doivent « se conformer ou s'expliquer », la réglementation provinciale uniformisée exigeant la communication d'information sur les pratiques de gouvernance. Les sociétés peuvent se conformer à ces exigences soit en adoptant volontairement les pratiques d'excellence recommandées (en choisissant l'adoption), soit en expliquant les pratiques différentes qu'elles ont adoptées pour atteindre les mêmes objectifs de gouvernance (en choisissant l'explication). Les sociétés qui ne se conforment pas (celles qui ne choisissent ni l'adoption ni l'explication) dérogent à la réglementation canadienne à laquelle sont assujetties les valeurs mobilières en ce qui a trait à la gouvernance. En analysant un échantillon constitué manuellement de 742 sociétés ouvertes canadiennes et de 16 recommandations en matière de gouvernance, ils constatent qu'en moyenne 82 pour cent des sociétés se sont conformées en adoptant les pratiques d'excellence et que 4 pour cent de plus se sont conformées en s'expliquant. L'étude révèle également que 39 pour cent des sociétés ouvertes canadiennes se conforment intégralement aux 16 recommandations examinées, en choisissant l'adoption ou l'explication. Afin d'élargir le contexte de ces résultats, les auteurs comparent les taux de conformité du Canada aux taux de conformité de l'Australie, un pays semblable au Canada et dont les recommandations en matière de gouvernance s'apparentent aux recommandations canadiennes. L'échantillon de données provenant de 1 334 sociétés australiennes fourni par l'ASX révèle un taux de conformité intégrale de 74 pour cent par rapport à 39 pour cent au Canada. Cette comparaison révèle que la conformité par adoption des pratiques d'excellence est plus courante au Canada, alors que la conformité par explication est plus courante en Australie. Dans leur analyse de la conformité aux différentes recommandations, les auteurs constatent que la moitié des recommandations sont davantage susceptibles d'être respectées en Australie, et l'autre moitié, plus susceptibles d'être respectées au Canada.

Suggested Citation

  • Steven E. Salterio & Joan E. D. Conrod & Regan N. Schmidt, 2013. "Canadian Evidence of Adherence to “Comply or Explain” Corporate Governance Codes: An International Comparison," Accounting Perspectives, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 12(1), pages 23-51, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:accper:v:12:y:2013:i:1:p:23-51
    DOI: 10.1111/1911-3838.12006
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Regan Schmidt, 2015. "Discussant Comment on An Examination of the Effect of CEO Social Ties and CEO Reputation on Nonprofessional Investors’ Say-on-Pay Judgments, by Steve Kaplan, Janet Samuels, Jeffrey Cohen," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 126(1), pages 119-123, January.
    2. Yan Luo & Steven E. Salterio, 2021. "Toward an Archival Measure of the Likelihood of Auditor‐Client Management Negotiation: An Exploration of the Audit Lag Measures Conjecture†," Accounting Perspectives, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 20(1), pages 109-143, March.
    3. Evans Gary L., 2018. "Bold vision: Gender diversity stuck in transition," Economics and Business Review, Sciendo, vol. 4(4), pages 97-114, November.
    4. Leona Achtenhagen & Petra Inwinkl & Jacob Björktorp & Robert Källenius, 2018. "More than two decades after the Cadbury Report: How far has Sweden, as role model for corporate-governance practices, come?," International Journal of Disclosure and Governance, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 15(4), pages 235-251, November.
    5. Elkins, Hamilton & Entwistle, Gary & Schmidt, Regan N., 2021. "The influence of opportunistic capital structure disclosure in international financial reporting on nonprofessional investors," Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, Elsevier, vol. 42(C).
    6. Sorana Mihaela Manoiu & Maria Ionela Damian & Jiri Strouhal, 2015. "Corporate Governance Quality On Specific Case Of Romanian Listed Companies," International Journal of Entrepreneurial Knowledge, Center for International Scientific Research of VSO and VSPP, vol. 3(2), pages 40-58, December.
    7. Ozili, Peterson K, 2020. "Corporate governance research in Nigeria: a review," MPRA Paper 98217, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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