IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/wly/accper/v11y2012i4p229-257.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Credibility Attributes and Investor Perceptions of Non‐GAAP Earnings Exclusions

Author

Listed:
  • Gary M. Entwistle
  • Glenn D. Feltham
  • Chima Mbagwu

Abstract

Recent empirical evidence suggests that investors focus more on non‐GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) than on traditional GAAP earnings because non‐GAAP earnings are believed to proxy for a firm's ongoing profitability, a measure useful for valuation. Managers determine these non‐GAAP earnings by excluding certain items from their GAAP income. However, because these non‐GAAP earnings are both unaudited and may be disclosed by a firm to manage investors’ perceptions as opposed to inform, investors must infer the credibility of the disclosure through observable firm attributes. In this study we examine whether firms with stronger credibility attributes (corporate governance, higher‐quality auditors, and higher historical information quality) will be perceived as providing more credible non‐GAAP exclusions than those with weaker attributes. Our expectation is that the market reaction to non‐GAAP earnings exclusions of firms with stronger credibility attributes will be greater than for those with weaker attributes. Our results support our expectation. Attributs de crédibilité et perception par les investisseurs des éléments exclus dans le calcul des résultats non conformes aux PCGR Résumé Les données empiriques récentes semblent indiquer que les investisseurs s'intéressent davantage aux résultats non conformes aux PCGR (principes comptables généralement reconnus) qu'aux résultats traditionnels conformes aux PCGR, estimant que les résultats non conformes aux PCGR sont une mesure substitutive de la rentabilité à long terme d'une entreprise, un indicateur utile à l’évaluation. Les gestionnaires établissent les résultats non conformes aux PCGR en excluant certains des éléments pris en compte dans le calcul des résultats conformes aux PCGR. Toutefois, ces résultats non conformes aux PCGR n’étant pas audités et pouvant être présentés par l'entreprise dans l'intention de conditionner la perception des investisseurs plutôt que de les informer, lesdits investisseurs doivent formuler une hypothèse quant à la crédibilité de l'information publiée, en s'appuyant sur les attributs observables de l'entreprise. Dans la présente étude, les auteurs se demandent si les éléments exclus dans le calcul des résultats non conformes aux PCGR seront perçus comme étant plus crédibles dans le cas des entreprises ayant des attributs de crédibilité plus convaincants (gouvernance d'entreprise, auditeurs de calibre supérieur et qualité supérieure de l'information historique) que dans celui des entreprises dont les attributs de crédibilité sont moins convaincants. Les auteurs s'attendent à ce que la réaction du marché aux éléments exclus dans le calcul des résultats non conformes aux PCGR des entreprises dont les attributs de crédibilité sont plus convaincants soit plus marquée que la réaction du marché aux mêmes éléments dans le cas des entreprises chez qui ces attributs sont moins convaincants. Les résultats obtenus par les auteurs confirment cette hypothèse.

Suggested Citation

  • Gary M. Entwistle & Glenn D. Feltham & Chima Mbagwu, 2012. "Credibility Attributes and Investor Perceptions of Non‐GAAP Earnings Exclusions," Accounting Perspectives, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 11(4), pages 229-257, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:accper:v:11:y:2012:i:4:p:229-257
    DOI: 10.1111/1911-3838.12000
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3838.12000
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/1911-3838.12000?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Edward J. Riedl & Suraj Srinivasan, 2010. "Signaling Firm Performance Through Financial Statement Presentation: An Analysis Using Special Items," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 27(1), pages 8-8, March.
    2. Eng, L. L. & Mak, Y. T., 2003. "Corporate governance and voluntary disclosure," Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 325-345.
    3. Nerissa C. Brown & Theodore E. Christensen & W. Brooke Elliott & Richard D. Mergenthaler, 2012. "Investor Sentiment and Pro Forma Earnings Disclosures," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(1), pages 1-40, March.
    4. Jennifer Francis & Dhananjay Nanda & Per Olsson, 2008. "Voluntary Disclosure, Earnings Quality, and Cost of Capital," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(1), pages 53-99, March.
    5. Jennings, R, 1987. "Unsystematic Security Price Movements, Management Earnings Forecasts, And Revisions In Consensus Analyst Earnings Forecasts," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(1), pages 90-110.
    6. K. J. Martijn Cremers & Vinay B. Nair, 2005. "Governance Mechanisms and Equity Prices," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 60(6), pages 2859-2894, December.
    7. Paul Gompers & Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick, 2003. "Corporate Governance and Equity Prices," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 118(1), pages 107-156.
    8. Edward J. Riedl & Suraj Srinivasan, 2010. "Signaling Firm Performance Through Financial Statement Presentation: An Analysis Using Special Items," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 27(1), pages 289-332, March.
    9. Amy P. Hutton & Gregory S. Miller & Douglas J. Skinner, 2003. "The Role of Supplementary Statements with Management Earnings Forecasts," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(5), pages 867-890, December.
    10. Fama, Eugene F. & French, Kenneth R., 1997. "Industry costs of equity," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 153-193, February.
    11. Chen, Charles J. P. & Jaggi, Bikki, 2000. "Association between independent non-executive directors, family control and financial disclosures in Hong Kong," Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 19(4-5), pages 285-310.
    12. Mitchell A. Petersen, 2009. "Estimating Standard Errors in Finance Panel Data Sets: Comparing Approaches," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(1), pages 435-480, January.
    13. Bipin Ajinkya & Sanjeev Bhojraj & Partha Sengupta, 2005. "The Association between Outside Directors, Institutional Investors and the Properties of Management Earnings Forecasts," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(3), pages 343-376, June.
    14. Patricia M. Dechow & Richard G. Sloan & Amy P. Sweeney, 1996. "Causes and Consequences of Earnings Manipulation: An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 13(1), pages 1-36, March.
    15. Hirshleifer, David & Teoh, Siew Hong, 2003. "Limited attention, information disclosure, and financial reporting," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(1-3), pages 337-386, December.
    16. Kanagaretnam, Kiridaran & Krishnan, Gopal V. & Lobo, Gerald J., 2009. "Is the market valuation of banks' loan loss provision conditional on auditor reputation?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(6), pages 1039-1047, June.
    17. Titman, Sheridan & Trueman, Brett, 1986. "Information quality and the valuation of new issues," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 159-172, June.
    18. Feng Gu & John Q. Li, 2007. "The Credibility of Voluntary Disclosure and Insider Stock Transactions," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(4), pages 771-810, September.
    19. Verrecchia, Robert E., 1990. "Information quality and discretionary disclosure," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 365-380, March.
    20. Paul R. Milgrom, 1981. "Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(2), pages 380-391, Autumn.
    21. Klein, April, 2002. "Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings management," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 375-400, August.
    22. Gu, Zhaoyang & Chen, Ting, 2004. "Analysts' treatment of nonrecurring items in street earnings," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 129-170, December.
    23. David Burgstahler & James Jiambalvo & Terry Shevlin, 2002. "Do Stock Prices Fully Reflect the Implications of Special Items for Future Earnings?," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(3), pages 585-612, June.
    24. Karl E. Hackenbrack & Chris E. Hogan, 2002. "Market Response to Earnings Surprises Conditional on Reasons for an Auditor Change," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 19(2), pages 195-223, June.
    25. Irene Karamanou & Nikos Vafeas, 2005. "The Association between Corporate Boards, Audit Committees, and Management Earnings Forecasts: An Empirical Analysis," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(3), pages 453-486, June.
    26. Kanagaretnam, Kiridaran & Lim, Chee Yeow & Lobo, Gerald J., 2010. "Auditor reputation and earnings management: International evidence from the banking industry," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(10), pages 2318-2327, October.
    27. Sanjeev Bhojraj & Charles M. C. Lee & Derek K. Oler, 2003. "What's My Line? A Comparison of Industry Classification Schemes for Capital Market Research," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(5), pages 745-774, December.
    28. Basu, Sudipta, 1997. "The conservatism principle and the asymmetric timeliness of earnings," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 3-37, December.
    29. Nikos Vafeas, 2005. "Audit Committees, Boards, and the Quality of Reported Earnings," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 22(4), pages 1093-1122, December.
    30. Mark T. Bradshaw & Richard G. Sloan, 2002. "GAAP versus The Street: An Empirical Assessment of Two Alternative Definitions of Earnings," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(1), pages 41-66, March.
    31. Jiraporn, Pornsit & Kim, Young Sang & Davidson, Wallace N. & Singh, Manohar, 2006. "Corporate governance, shareholder rights and firm diversification: An empirical analysis," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 947-963, March.
    32. Verrecchia, Robert E., 1983. "Discretionary disclosure," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 179-194, April.
    33. Grossman, S J & Hart, O D, 1980. "Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 35(2), pages 323-334, May.
    34. Ross Jennings & Ana Marques, 2011. "The Joint Effects of Corporate Governance and Regulation on the Disclosure of Manager-Adjusted Non-GAAP Earnings in the US," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(3-4), pages 364-394, April.
    35. Kanagaretnam, Kiridaran & Lobo, Gerald J. & Whalen, Dennis J., 2007. "Does good corporate governance reduce information asymmetry around quarterly earnings announcements?," Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 497-522.
    36. Gul, Ferdinand A. & Fung, Simon Yu Kit & Jaggi, Bikki, 2009. "Earnings quality: Some evidence on the role of auditor tenure and auditors' industry expertise," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(3), pages 265-287, June.
    37. Pownall, G & Waymire, G, 1989. "Voluntary Disclosure Credibility And Securities Prices - Evidence From Management Earnings Forecasts, 1969-73," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(2), pages 227-245.
    38. Charles Hsu & William Kross, 2011. "The Market Pricing of Special Items that are Included in versus Excluded from Street Earnings," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 28(3), pages 990-1017, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Yang, Yiru & Abeysekera, Indra, 2019. "Duration of equity overvaluation and managers’ choice to use aggressive underlying earnings disclosure and accrual-based earnings management: Australian evidence," Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 167-185.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Beyer, Anne & Cohen, Daniel A. & Lys, Thomas Z. & Walther, Beverly R., 2010. "The financial reporting environment: Review of the recent literature," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2-3), pages 296-343, December.
    2. Luminita Enache & Antonio Parbonetti & Anup Srivastava, 2020. "Are all outside directors created equal with respect to firm disclosure policy?," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 55(2), pages 541-577, August.
    3. Cheng, Lee-Young & Su, Yi-Chen & Yan, Zhipeng & Zhao, Yan, 2019. "Corporate governance and target price accuracy," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 93-101.
    4. Dechow, Patricia & Ge, Weili & Schrand, Catherine, 2010. "Understanding earnings quality: A review of the proxies, their determinants and their consequences," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2-3), pages 344-401, December.
    5. Stephan Hollander & Maarten Pronk & Erik Roelofsen, 2010. "Does Silence Speak? An Empirical Analysis of Disclosure Choices During Conference Calls," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(3), pages 531-563, June.
    6. Nooraisah Katmon & Omar Al-Farooque, 2019. "The Reciprocal Relationship Between Earnings Management, Disclosure Quality and Board Independence: UK Evidence," Research in World Economy, Research in World Economy, Sciedu Press, vol. 10(5), pages 63-80, December.
    7. Nancy Harp & Mark Myring & Rebecca Shortridge, 2014. "Do Variations in the Strength of Corporate Governance Still Matter? A Comparison of the Pre- and Post-Regulation Environment," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 122(3), pages 361-373, July.
    8. Imhof, Michael J & Seavey, Scott E., 2018. "How investors value cash and cash flows when managers commit to providing earnings forecasts," Advances in accounting, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 74-87.
    9. DeFond, Mark & Zhang, Jieying, 2014. "A review of archival auditing research," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 275-326.
    10. Sugato Chakravarty & Chiraphol N. Chiyachantana & Christine Jiang, 2011. "THE CHOICE OF TRADING VENUE AND RELATIVE PRICE IMPACT OF INSTITUTIONAL TRADING: ADRs VERSUS THE UNDERLYING SECURITIES IN THEIR LOCAL MARKETS," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 34(4), pages 537-567, December.
    11. Ann Ling-Ching Chan & Edward Lee & Jirada Petaibanlue & Ning Tan, 2017. "Do board interlocks motivate voluntary disclosure? Evidence from Taiwan," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 48(2), pages 441-466, February.
    12. Lutfa Tilat Ferdous & Kamran Ahmed & Darren Henry, 2023. "An Empirical Investigation of the Effect of CFO Power on Disclosure Quality," Abacus, Accounting Foundation, University of Sydney, vol. 59(2), pages 606-649, June.
    13. Barakat, Ahmed & Chernobai, Anna & Wahrenburg, Mark, 2014. "Information asymmetry around operational risk announcements," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 152-179.
    14. Edith Leung & David Veenman, 2018. "Non‐GAAP Earnings Disclosure in Loss Firms," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(4), pages 1083-1137, September.
    15. Seo, Hojun, 2021. "Peer effects in corporate disclosure decisions," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(1).
    16. DeBoskey, D.G. & Luo, Yan & Wang, Jeff J., 2018. "Do specialized board committees impact the transparency of corporate political disclosure? Evidence from S&P 500 companies," Research in Accounting Regulation, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 8-19.
    17. García Osma, Beatriz & Guillamón-Saorín, Encarna, 2011. "Corporate governance and impression management in annual results press releases," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 187-208.
    18. Simeng Liu & Kun Tracy Wang & Yue Wu, 2024. "Corporate Governance Reforms and Analyst Forecasts: International Evidence," Abacus, Accounting Foundation, University of Sydney, vol. 60(2), pages 272-304, June.
    19. Carol Anilowski Cain & Kalin S. Kolev & Sarah McVay, 2020. "Detecting Opportunistic Special Items," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(5), pages 2099-2119, May.
    20. Wendy Beekes & Philip Brown, 2006. "Do Better‐Governed Australian Firms Make More Informative Disclosures?," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(3‐4), pages 422-450, April.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wly:accper:v:11:y:2012:i:4:p:229-257. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://doi.org/10.1111/(ISSN)1911-3838 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.