IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/wea/econth/v9y2020i2p55.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

What can Economists Learn from Deleuze?

Author

Listed:
  • Abderrazak Belabes

    (King Abdulaziz University, Saudi Arabia)

Abstract

Listening, seeing and reading Gilles Deleuze has had an influence on my thinking more than most of the economic writings I have consulted over the past quarter of a century. This discovery and furtherance of knowledge enriched my reflection and also allowed me to go beyond the general philosopher, as a philosopher opening the way to new horizons. It makes the researcher aware that the most important thing is not the philosopher man but the man philosopher, i.e. the one who writes something that touches a human being at his deepest level and concerns him in his life every day. New generations of economists should meditate on this by going beyond the chapel quarrels coming from the Schumpeterian dichotomy 'science versus ideology'. To quote one of Deleuze's main ideas, no thinking against anything has been important over a long period; what counts are thoughts for something new that affect people's lives, and which are produced with rigor. This opens the way to a thought for life and not against life, which is in line with the progress of research in methodology, where it is a question of giving more importance to social ontology as a level of analysis and not focusing solely on epistemology in the narrowest sense.

Suggested Citation

  • Abderrazak Belabes, 2020. "What can Economists Learn from Deleuze?," Economic Thought, World Economics Association, vol. 9(2), pages 55-67, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:wea:econth:v:9:y:2020:i:2:p:55
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://et.worldeconomicsassociation.org/papers/what-can-economists-learn-from-deleuze/
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: http://et.worldeconomicsassociation.org/files/2020/12/WEA-ET-9.2-Belabes.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Barthold, Charles & Dunne, Stephen & Harvie, David, 2018. "Resisting financialisation with Deleuze and Guattari: The case of Occupy Wall Street," CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON ACCOUNTING, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 4-16.
    2. Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 90(4), pages 629-649.
    3. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Innes, Robert, 1987. "Adverse Selection And Tax Externalities In A Model Of Entrepreneurial Investment," Working Papers 225812, University of California, Davis, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    2. Michael Manove & A. Jorge Padilla & Marco Pagano, 1998. "Collateral vs. Project Screening: A Model of Lazy Banks," CSEF Working Papers 10, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    3. Bo Liu & James D. Shilling & Tien Foo Sing, 2020. "Large Banks and Efficient Banks: how Do they Influence Credit Supply and Default Risk?," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 57(1), pages 1-28, February.
    4. AKM Rezaul Hossain, 2005. "A Simple Model of Credit Rationing with Information Externalities," Working papers 2005-11, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
    5. de Meza, David & Reito, Francesco, 2019. "Too Little Lending: A Problem of Symmetric Information," MPRA Paper 93700, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Inderst, Roman & Wambach, Achim, 2001. "Competitive insurance markets under adverse selection and capacity constraints," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(10), pages 1981-1992, December.
    7. Greenwald, Bruce C. & Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1987. "Imperfect information, credit markets and unemployment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 31(1-2), pages 444-456.
    8. Ariel Zetlin-Jones & Ali Shourideh, 2010. "Aggregate Fluctuations with Adverse Selection in Credit Markets," 2010 Meeting Papers 376, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    9. Beyhaghi, Mehdi & Mahmoudi, Babak & Mohammadi, Ali, 2013. "Adverse Selection and Search Frictions in Corporate Loan Contracts," MPRA Paper 49780, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Duqi, Andi & McGowan, Danny & Onali, Enrico & Torluccio, Giuseppe, 2021. "Natural disasters and economic growth: The role of banking market structure," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
    11. Mark Gertler, 1988. "Financial structure and aggregate economic activity: an overview," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, pages 559-596.
    12. Thomas J. Miceli, 1989. "Housing Rental Contracts and Adverse Selection with an Application to the Rent‐Own Decision," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 17(4), pages 403-421, December.
    13. Gregory S. Crawford & Nicola Pavanini & Fabiano Schivardi, 2018. "Asymmetric Information and Imperfect Competition in Lending Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 108(7), pages 1659-1701, July.
    14. Coco, G. & Pignataro, G., 2011. "Perverse cross-subsidization in the credit market," Working Papers 11/01, Department of Economics, City University London.
    15. Joshua Henkel, 2022. "Economics & Biology: The whole is something besides the parts – a complementary approach to a bioeconomy," Bremen Papers on Economics & Innovation 2210, University of Bremen, Faculty of Business Studies and Economics.
    16. Ikeda, Daisuke, 2020. "Adverse selection, lemons shocks and business cycles," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 94-112.
    17. Frieden, B. Roy & Hawkins, Raymond J., 2010. "Asymmetric information and economics," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 389(2), pages 287-295.
    18. Chade, Hector & Schlee, Edward E., 2020. "Insurance as a lemons market: Coverage denials and pooling," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 189(C).
    19. Bose, Niloy & Cothren, Richard, 1996. "Equilibrium loan contracts and endogenous growth in the presence of asymmetric information," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 363-376, October.
    20. Ibrahimo, M.V. & Barros, C.P., 2009. "Relevance or irrelevance of capital structure?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 473-479, March.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wea:econth:v:9:y:2020:i:2:p:55. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Jake McMurchie (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/worecea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.