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Absurda lex, sed lex? Public value and the decay of the Rule of Law: A conceptual perspective

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  • Behar-Villegas Erick

    (Faculty of Business Administration, Berlin International University of Applied Sciences, Salzufer 6, Berlin 10587, Germany)

Abstract

The Rule of Law serves, under a broadly accepted notion of justice, the enforcement of property rights and a relative predictability of citizen affairs, i.e. it fosters Public Value. However, it is subject to risks that materialise in weakened institutions, uncertainty and transaction costs. The connection between Public Value and the Rule of Law becomes salient when understanding how the latter degenerates at the expense of the former. This article provides two theoretical frameworks that explain the connection between the two concepts, as well as three manifestations of the Rule of Law’s decay. These comprise the excess of legal-formalism, the excess of discretion in enforcement and the instrumentalisation of the law, i.e. when it embodies injustice. Although they vary depending on the legal system, these aspects build a conceptual body that illustrates how contingent legal outcomes affect society, developing Daly’s (2019) concept of democratic decay in the economics and business literature.

Suggested Citation

  • Behar-Villegas Erick, 2022. "Absurda lex, sed lex? Public value and the decay of the Rule of Law: A conceptual perspective," Economics and Business Review, Sciendo, vol. 8(3), pages 7-26, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:vrs:ecobur:v:8:y:2022:i:3:p:7-26:n:5
    DOI: 10.18559/ebr.2022.3.2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. R. H. Coase, 2013. "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 837-877.
    2. North, Douglass C. & Weingast, Barry R., 1989. "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(4), pages 803-832, December.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public Value; Rule of Law; legal-formalism; legal institutions; democratic decay; property rights;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K15 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Civil Law; Common Law
    • K49 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Other
    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies
    • P14 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Property Rights

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