IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ulp/buopee/v18y2008m07i4.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Transparence, responsabilité et légitimité de la Banque Centrale Européenne

Author

Listed:
  • Giuseppe Diana

    (Université de Strasbourg ( BETA))

Abstract

Dans cet article, nous avançons la thèse que la Banque Centrale Européenne (BCE) devrait accroître son degré de transparence, notamment en rendant publiques les délibérations du Conseil des gouverneurs. Cela aurait pour conséquence de rendre sa politique monétaire plus lisible et donc plus efficace. Cela lui permettrait également d’augmenter sa légitimité démocratique, unique rempart contre les critiques répétées et souvent infondées dont elle fait l’objet.

Suggested Citation

  • Giuseppe Diana, 2008. "Transparence, responsabilité et légitimité de la Banque Centrale Européenne," Bulletin de l'Observatoire des politiques économiques en Europe, Observatoire des Politiques Économiques en Europe (OPEE), vol. 18(1), pages 11-13, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:ulp:buopee:v:18:y:2008:m:07:i:4
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://opee.unistra.fr/Transparence-responsabilite-et
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Petra M. Geraats, 2002. "Central Bank Transparency," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(483), pages 532-565, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Akosah, Nana Kwame & Alagidede, Imhotep Paul & Schaling, Eric, 2020. "Testing for asymmetry in monetary policy rule for small-open developing economies: Multiscale Bayesian quantile evidence from Ghana," The Journal of Economic Asymmetries, Elsevier, vol. 22(C).
    2. Gruener Hans Peter & Hayo Bernd & Hefeker Carsten, 2009. "Unions, Wage Setting and Monetary Policy Uncertainty," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-25, October.
    3. Kenneth N Kuttner, 2004. "A Snapshot of Inflation Targeting in its Adolescence," RBA Annual Conference Volume (Discontinued), in: Christopher Kent & Simon Guttmann (ed.),The Future of Inflation Targeting, Reserve Bank of Australia.
    4. Jonne Lehtimäki & Marianne Palmu, 2022. "Who Should You Listen to in a Crisis? Differences in Communication of Central Bank Policymakers," Journal of Central Banking Theory and Practice, Central bank of Montenegro, vol. 11(3), pages 33-57.
    5. Bernd Hayo & Matthias Neuenkirch, 2018. "Central Banks' Predictability: An Assessment by Financial Market Participants," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 14(4), pages 163-185, September.
    6. Baeriswyl, Romain & Cornand, Camille, 2010. "The signaling role of policy actions," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(6), pages 682-695, September.
    7. Camille Cornand & Frank Heinemann, 2015. "Macro-expérimentation autour des fonctions des banques centrales," Revue française d'économie, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 0(2), pages 3-47.
    8. Crowe, Christopher & Meade, Ellen E., 2008. "Central bank independence and transparency: Evolution and effectiveness," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 763-777, December.
    9. Bernd Hayo & Ummad Mazhar, 2014. "Monetary Policy Committee Transparency: Measurement, Determinants, and Economic Effects," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 25(4), pages 739-770, September.
    10. Horváth, Roman & Jonášová, Júlia, 2015. "Central banks' voting records, the financial crisis and future monetary policy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 229-243.
    11. Jan Libich & Andrew Hughes Hallett & Petr Stehlik, 2007. "Monetary And Fiscal Policy Interaction With Various Degrees And Types Of Commitment," CAMA Working Papers 2007-21, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
    12. Giuseppe Ciccarone & Enrico Marchetti & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, 2007. "Unions, Fiscal Policy And Central Bank Transparency," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 75(5), pages 617-633, September.
    13. Edda Claus & Mardi Dungey, 2015. "Can monetary policy surprise the market?," CAMA Working Papers 2015-05, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
    14. Frenkel, Michael & Pierdzioch, Christian & Stadtmann, Georg, 2006. "The transparency of the ECB policy: What can we learn from its foreign exchange market interventions?," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 141-156, February.
    15. Viv Hall, 2003. "Central Bank Governance: Common Elements or Different Models?," Working Papers 202003, Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research.
    16. Pierre Gosselin & Aileen Lotz & Charles Wyplosz, 2009. "Interest Rate Signals and Central Bank Transparency," NBER Chapters, in: NBER International Seminar on Macroeconomics 2007, pages 9-51, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. Abdul Rishad & Sanjeev Gupta & Akhil Sharma, 2021. "Official Intervention and Exchange Rate Determination: Evidence from India," Global Journal of Emerging Market Economies, Emerging Markets Forum, vol. 13(3), pages 357-379, September.
    18. Ana Lasaosa, 2007. "Learning the Rules of the New Game? Comparing the Reactions in Financial Markets to Announcements before and after the Bank of England's Operational Independence," Ekonomia, Cyprus Economic Society and University of Cyprus, vol. 10(1), pages 18-41, Summer.
    19. George-Marios Angeletos & Alessandro Pavan, 2005. "Efficiency and Welfare with Complementarities and Asymmetric Information," NBER Working Papers 11826, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    20. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/5221 is not listed on IDEAS
    21. G. C. Montes & L. V. Oliveira & A. Curi & R. T. F. Nicolay, 2016. "Effects of transparency, monetary policy signalling and clarity of central bank communication on disagreement about inflation expectations," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 48(7), pages 590-607, February.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ulp:buopee:v:18:y:2008:m:07:i:4. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/opstrfr.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.