An Incentive Model of the Effect of Parental Income on Children
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.1086/319556
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Chwe, Michael Suk-Young, 1990. "Why Were Workers Whipped? Pain in a Principal-Agent Model," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 100(403), pages 1109-1121, December.
- Bergstrom, Theodore C, 1989. "A Fresh Look at the Rotten Kid Theorem--and Other Household Mysteries," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(5), pages 1138-1159, October.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Ernesto Dal Bó & Pedro Dal Bó & Rafael Di Tella, 2007. "Reputation When Threats and Transfers Are Available," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(3), pages 577-598, September.
- repec:lan:wpaper:2152 is not listed on IDEAS
- Boadway, Robin & Song, Zhen & Tremblay, Jean-François, 2013. "Non-cooperative pollution control in an inter-jurisdictional setting," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(5), pages 783-796.
- Timothy Goodspeed & Andrew Haughwout, 2012.
"On the optimal design of disaster insurance in a federation,"
Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 1-27, March.
- Timothy J. Goodspeed & Andrew Haughwout, 2006. "On the Optimal Design of Disaster Insurance in a Federation," Working Papers 2006-14, University of Kentucky, Institute for Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations.
- Timothy J. Goodspeed & Andrew Haughwout, 2011. "On the Optimal Design of Disaster Insurance in a Federation," Economics Working Paper Archive at Hunter College 436, Hunter College Department of Economics.
- Timothy J. Goodspeed & Andrew F. Haughwout, 2009. "On the optimal design of disaster insurance in a federation," Working Papers 2009/25, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
- Timothy J. Goodspeed & Andrew Haughwout, 2007. "On the Optimal Design of Disaster Insurance in a Federation," CESifo Working Paper Series 1888, CESifo.
- Johan Lagerl–f, 2004.
"Efficiency-enhancing signalling in the Samaritan's dilemma,"
Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 114(492), pages 55-69, January.
- Johan Lagerlof, 2002. "Efficiency-Enhancing Signalling in the Samaritan's Dilemma," Microeconomics 0207001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Lagerlof, Johan, 2003. "Efficiency-Enhancing Signalling in the Samaritan's Dilemma," CEPR Discussion Papers 3842, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- James Berry, 2015. "Child Control in Education Decisions: An Evaluation of Targeted Incentives to Learn in India," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 50(4), pages 1051-1080.
- Jara-Díaz, Sergio & Rosales-Salas, Jorge, 2017. "Beyond transport time: A review of time use modeling," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 209-230.
- Bond, Philip & Newman, Andrew F., 2009.
"Prohibitions on punishments in private contracts,"
Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 526-540, October.
- Andrew Newman & Philip Bond, 2004. "Prohibitions on Punishments in Private Contracts," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 143, Econometric Society.
- Philip Bond & Andrew F. Newman, 2006. "Prohibitions on Punishments in Private Contracts," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2006-060, Boston University - Department of Economics.
- David Card & Gordon B. Dahl, 2011.
"Family Violence and Football: The Effect of Unexpected Emotional Cues on Violent Behavior,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 126(1), pages 103-143.
- David Card & Gordon Dahl, 2009. "Family Violence and Football: The Effect of Unexpected Emotional Cues on Violent Behavior," NBER Working Papers 15497, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Card, David & Dahl, Gordon B., 2010. "Family Violence and Football: The Effect of Unexpected Emotional Cues on Violent Behavior," IZA Discussion Papers 4869, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- David Card & Gordon Dahl, 2009. "Family Violence and Football: The Effect of Unexpected Emotional Cues on Violent Behavior," RCER Working Papers 546, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
- Haluk I. Ergin & Serdar Sayan, 1997.
"A Microeconomic Analysis of Slavery in Comparison to Free Labor Economies,"
Economic History
9710001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Haluk Ergin & Serdar Sayan, 1997. "A Microeconomic Analysis of Slavery in Comparison to Free Labor Economies," Working Papers 9708, Department of Economics, Bilkent University.
- Jonathan Conning, 2004. "The Causes of Slavery or Serfdom and the Roads to Agrarian Capitalism: Domar's Hypothesis Revisited," Economics Working Paper Archive at Hunter College 401, Hunter College Department of Economics.
- Donald Cox, 2001. "How Do People Decide to Allocate Transfers Among Family Members?," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 514, Boston College Department of Economics.
- Cigno, A., 2016.
"Conflict and Cooperation Within the Family, and Between the State and the Family, in the Provision of Old-Age Security,"
Handbook of the Economics of Population Aging, in: Piggott, John & Woodland, Alan (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Population Aging, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 0, pages 609-660,
Elsevier.
- Alessandro Cigno, 2014. "Conflict and Cooperation within the Family, and between the State and the Family, in the Provision of Old-Age Security," CHILD Working Papers Series 22, Centre for Household, Income, Labour and Demographic Economics (CHILD) - CCA.
- Man Si, 2015. "Intrafamily bargaining and love," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 771-789, December.
- Francis Bloch & Vijayendra Rao, 2002.
"Terror as a Bargaining Instrument: A Case Study of Dowry Violence in Rural India,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1029-1043, September.
- Bloch, Francis & Rao, Vijayendra, 1999. "Terror as a Bargaining Instrument : A Case-Study of Dowry Violence in Rural India," LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES 1999020, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
- Bloch, Francis & Rao, Vijayendra, 2000. "Terror as a bargaining instrument : a case study of dowry violence in rural India," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2347, The World Bank.
- André de Palma & Nathalie Picard & Ignacio Inoa, 2014.
"Discrete choice decision-making with multiple decision-makers within the household,"
Chapters, in: Stephane Hess & Andrew Daly (ed.), Handbook of Choice Modelling, chapter 16, pages 363-382,
Edward Elgar Publishing.
- André de Palma & Nathalie Picard & Ignacio Inoa, 2013. "Discrete Choice Decision-Making with Multiple Decision Makers within the Household," Working Papers hal-00812835, HAL.
- André de Palma & Nathalie Picard & Ignacio Inoa, 2014. "Discrete Choice Decision-Making with Multiple Decision Makers within the Household," Working Papers hal-00969216, HAL.
- Nathalie Picard & André de Palma & Ignacio A. Inoa, 2013. "Discrete Choice Decision-Making with Multiple Decision Makers within the Household," THEMA Working Papers 2013-03, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Nagase, Yoko & Silva, Emilson C. D., 2000. "Optimal Control of Acid Rain in a Federation with Decentralized Leadership and Information," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 164-180, September.
- Russell Cooper & Hubert Kempf & Dan Peled, 2004. "Is it is or is it Ain't my Obligation? Regional Debt in Monetary Unions," NBER Working Papers 10239, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Jere R. Behrman, 1994. "Intra-family Distribution in Developing Countries," The Pakistan Development Review, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, vol. 33(3), pages 253-296.
- Damien de Walque & Christine Valente, 2023.
"Incentivizing School Attendance in the Presence of Parent-Child Information Frictions,"
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 15(3), pages 256-285, August.
- de Walque, Damien & Valente, Christine, 2018. "Incentivizing School Attendance in the Presence of Parent-Child Information Frictions," IZA Discussion Papers 11637, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- De Walque,Damien B. C. M. & Valente,Christine, 2018. "Incentivizing school attendance in the presence of parent-child information frictions," Policy Research Working Paper Series 8476, The World Bank.
- Stefan Hochguertel & Henry Ohlsson, 2009. "Compensatory inter vivos gifts," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 24(6), pages 993-1023.
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:109:y:2001:i:2:p:266-280. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Journals Division (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JPE .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.