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Persuasion via Weak Institutions

Author

Listed:
  • Elliot Lipnowski
  • Doron Ravid
  • Denis Shishkin

Abstract

A sender commissions a study to persuade a receiver but influences the report with some probability. We show that increasing this probability can benefit the receiver and can lead to a discontinuous drop in the sender’s payoffs. To derive our results, we geometrically characterize the sender’s highest equilibrium payoff, which is based on the concavification of a capped value function.

Suggested Citation

  • Elliot Lipnowski & Doron Ravid & Denis Shishkin, 2022. "Persuasion via Weak Institutions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 130(10), pages 2705-2730.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/720462
    DOI: 10.1086/720462
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    Cited by:

    1. Yingkai Li & Boli Xu, 2024. "Falsifiable Test Design in Coordination Games," Papers 2405.18521, arXiv.org.
    2. Doval, Laura & Skreta, Vasiliki, 2024. "Mechanism design with limited commitment: Markov environments," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 167(C).
    3. Emir Kamenica & Xiao Lin, 2024. "Commitment and Randomization in Communication," Papers 2410.17503, arXiv.org.
    4. Eilat, Ran & Neeman, Zvika, 2023. "Communication with endogenous deception costs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
    5. Redlicki, Bartosz & Redlicki, Jakub, 2022. "Communication with Costly and Detectable Falsification," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 202(C), pages 452-470.
    6. Ricardo Alonso & Odilon Câmara, 2024. "Organizing Data Analytics," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 70(5), pages 3123-3143, May.
    7. Ayouni, Mehdi & Friehe, Tim & Gabuthy, Yannick, 2024. "Bayesian persuasion in lawyer–client communication," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
    8. Monte, Daniel & Linhares, Luis Henrique, 2023. "Stealth Startups, Clauses, and Add-ons: A Model of Strategic Obfuscation," MPRA Paper 115926, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Hedlund, Jonas & Hernandez-Chanto, Allan & Oyarzun, Carlos, 2024. "Contagion management through information disclosure," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 218(C).
    10. Emir Kamenica & Xiao Lin, 2024. "Commitment and Randomization in Communication," PIER Working Paper Archive 24-033, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    11. Liu, Yi & Wu, Fan, 2024. "Implementing randomized allocation rules with outcome-contingent transfers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 220(C).
    12. Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2023. "On the equivalence of information design by uninformed and informed principals," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(4), pages 1051-1067, November.
    13. Qianjun Lyu & Wing Suen, 2022. "Information Design in Cheap Talk," Papers 2207.04929, arXiv.org, revised May 2024.
    14. Pei, Harry, 2023. "Repeated communication with private lying costs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 210(C).
    15. Zhou, Junya, 2023. "Costly verification and commitment in persuasion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 212(C), pages 1100-1142.

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