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On the Empirical Content of Cheap-Talk Signaling: An Application to Bargaining

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  • Matthew Backus
  • Thomas Blake
  • Steven Tadelis

Abstract

We outline a framework for the empirical analysis of signaling games based on three features: sorting, incentive compatibility, and beliefs. We apply it to document cheap-talk signaling in the use of round-number offers during negotiations. Using millions of online bargaining interactions, we show that items listed at multiples of $100 receive offers that are 8–12 percent lower but are 15–25 percent more likely to sell, demonstrating the trade-off requisite for incentive compatibility. Those same sellers are more likely to accept a similar offer, and buyers are more likely to investigate their listings, consistent with seller sorting and buyer belief updating.

Suggested Citation

  • Matthew Backus & Thomas Blake & Steven Tadelis, 2019. "On the Empirical Content of Cheap-Talk Signaling: An Application to Bargaining," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 127(4), pages 1599-1628.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/701699
    DOI: 10.1086/701699
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    Cited by:

    1. Melissa Boyle & Justin Svec, 2022. "The Roundness of Antiquity Valuations from Auction Houses and Sales," Eastern Economic Journal, Palgrave Macmillan;Eastern Economic Association, vol. 48(4), pages 602-630, October.
    2. Abe Dunn & Joshua D Gottlieb & Adam Hale Shapiro & Daniel J Sonnenstuhl & Pietro Tebaldi, 2024. "A Denial a Day Keeps the Doctor Away," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 139(1), pages 187-233.
    3. Send, Jonas & Serena, Marco, 2022. "An empirical analysis of insistent bargaining," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
    4. Deichmann, Dirk & Gillier, Thomas & Tonellato, Marco, 2021. "Getting on board with new ideas: An analysis of idea commitments on a crowdsourcing platform," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 50(9).
    5. Karagözoğlu, Emin & Keskin, Kerim, 2024. "Consideration sets and reference points in a dynamic bargaining game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 219(C), pages 381-403.
    6. David Bounies & Antoine Dubus & Patrick Waelbroeck, 2020. "Market for Information and Selling Mechanisms," Working Papers ECARES 2020-07, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    7. David Bounie & Antoine Dubus & Patrick Waelbroeck, 2022. "Collecting and Selling Consumer Information: Selling Mechanisms Matter," Working Papers hal-02288708, HAL.
    8. Xu Zhang & Puneet Manchanda & Junhong Chu, 2021. "“Meet Me Halfway”: The Costs and Benefits of Bargaining," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 40(6), pages 1081-1105, November.
    9. Gizatulina, Alia & Gorelkina, Olga, 2021. "Selling “Money” on eBay: A field study of surplus division," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 181(C), pages 19-38.
    10. Kimbrough, Erik O. & Porter, David & Schneider, Mark, 2021. "Reference dependent prices in bargaining: An experimental examination of precise first offers," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 86(C).
    11. Sandro Shelegia & Joshua Sherman, 2018. "Bargaining at Retail Stores: Evidence from Vienna," Economics Working Papers 1606, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    12. Zhenling Jiang, 2022. "An Empirical Bargaining Model with Left-Digit Bias: A Study on Auto Loan Monthly Payments," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(1), pages 442-465, January.
    13. Joonhyuk Yang & Navdeep S. Sahni & Harikesh S. Nair & Xi Xiong, 2024. "Advertising as Information for Ranking E-Commerce Search Listings," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 43(2), pages 360-377, March.
    14. Rafiq Friperson & Hessel Oosterbeek & Bas van der Klaauw, 2023. "Competition modulates buyers’ reaction to sellers’ cheap talk," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 23-035/V, Tinbergen Institute.
    15. Petrowsky, Hannes M. & Schweinsberg, Martin & Seitz, Lennart & Funk, Burkhardt & Loschelder, David D., 2023. "Deal or no deal? How round vs precise percentage offers and price-ending mimicry affect impasse risk in over 25 million eBay negotiations," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 94(C).
    16. Tom Blake & Sarah Moshary & Kane Sweeney & Steve Tadelis, 2021. "Price Salience and Product Choice," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 40(4), pages 619-636, July.

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