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Making Corruption Harder: Asymmetric Information, Collusion, and Crime

Author

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  • Juan Ortner
  • Sylvain Chassang

Abstract

We model criminal investigation as a principal-agent-monitor problem in which the agent can bribe the monitor to destroy evidence. Building on insights from Laffont and Martimort’s 1997 paper, we study whether the principal can profitably introduce asymmetric information between agent and monitor by randomizing the monitor’s incentives. We show that it can be the case, but the optimality of random incentives depends on unobserved preexisting patterns of private information. We provide a data-driven framework for policy evaluation requiring only unverified reports. A potential local policy change is an improvement if, everything else equal, it is associated with greater reports of crime.

Suggested Citation

  • Juan Ortner & Sylvain Chassang, 2018. "Making Corruption Harder: Asymmetric Information, Collusion, and Crime," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 126(5), pages 2108-2133.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/699188
    DOI: 10.1086/699188
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Francesco Decarolis & Raymond Fisman & Paolo Pinotti & Silvia Vannutelli, 2019. "Rules, Discretion, and Corruption in Procurement: Evidence from Italian Government Contracting," Boston University - Department of Economics - The Institute for Economic Development Working Papers Series dp-344, Boston University - Department of Economics.
    2. Hsien-Yi Chen & Sheng-Syan Chen, 2023. "Can credit default swaps exert an enduring monitoring influence on political integrity?," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 60(2), pages 445-469, February.
    3. Jacopo Bizzotto & Alessandro De Chiara, 2022. "Frequent audits and honest audits," Working Papers 202202, Oslo Metropolitan University, Oslo Business School.
    4. Eduardo Perez‐Richet & Vasiliki Skreta, 2022. "Test Design Under Falsification," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(3), pages 1109-1142, May.
    5. Asseyer, Andreas, 2020. "Collusion and delegation under information control," Discussion Papers 2020/3, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
    6. Francesco Decarolis & Maris Goldmanis & Antonio Penta, 2020. "Marketing Agencies and Collusive Bidding in Online Ad Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(10), pages 4433-4454, October.
    7. Sylvain Chassang & Christian Zehnder, 2024. "Secure Survey Design in Organizations: Theory and Experiments," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 16(4), pages 371-405, November.
    8. Charles Angelucci & Antonio Russo, 2022. "Petty Corruption And Citizen Reports," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 63(2), pages 831-848, May.
    9. Alessandro De Chiara & Marco A. Schwarz, 2020. "A Dynamic Theory of Regulatory Capture," Working Papers 2020-12, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
    10. von Negenborn, Colin & Pollrich, Martin, 2020. "Sweet lemons: Mitigating collusion in organizations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 189(C).
    11. Garrett, Daniel F. & Georgiadis, George & Smolin, Alex & Szentes, Balázs, 2023. "Optimal technology design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 209(C).
    12. Tan, Teck Yong, 2023. "Optimal transparency of monitoring capability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 209(C).
    13. Mookherjee, Dilip & Motta, Alberto & Tsumagari, Masatoshi, 2020. "Consulting collusive experts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 290-317.
    14. Asseyer, Andreas, 2020. "Collusion and delegation under information control," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(4), November.
    15. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/31aa5v8jtp9p48jlhrq44psjoa is not listed on IDEAS
    16. S. Nageeb Ali & Nima Haghpanah & Xiao Lin & Ron Siegel, 2020. "How to Sell Hard Information," Papers 2010.08037, arXiv.org.
    17. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/31aa5v8jtp9p48jlhrq44psjoa is not listed on IDEAS
    18. Daniel Barron & Yingni Guo, 0. "The Use and Misuse of Coordinated Punishments," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 136(1), pages 471-504.
    19. Chiu Yu Ko & Bo Shen & Xuyao Zhang, 2023. "Can corruption encourage clean technology transfer?," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 25(3), pages 459-492, June.
    20. Skreta, Vasiliki & Perez-Richet, Eduardo, 2017. "Information Design under Falsification," CEPR Discussion Papers 12271, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    21. Daniele Condorelli & Massimiliano Furlan, 2023. "Cheap Talking Algorithms," Papers 2310.07867, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2024.
    22. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/31aa5v8jtp9p48jlhrq44psjoa is not listed on IDEAS
    23. Mookherjee, Dilip & Tsumagari, Masatoshi, 2023. "Regulatory mechanism design with extortionary collusion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 208(C).
    24. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/31aa5v8jtp9p48jlhrq44psjoa is not listed on IDEAS

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