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Two Models of Bid-Taker Cheating in Vickrey Auctions

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  • Rothkopf, Michael H
  • Harstad, Ronald M

Abstract

Vickrey (second-price sealed-bid) auctions have attractive theoretical properties but standard first-price sealed bidding is far more common. Explanations of the rarity of Vickrey auctions rely on concern about revelation of private information and on fear of cheating. The authors present two models of bid-taker cheating: a static, game-theoretic model and a reputation-based model of repeated auctions. In the first, an honest bid-taker will not choose a Vickrey auction. In the second, a trusted bid-taker who cheats when it pays eventually destroys his or her reputation and the trust on which the use of Vickrey auctions depends. Copyright 1995 by University of Chicago Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Rothkopf, Michael H & Harstad, Ronald M, 1995. "Two Models of Bid-Taker Cheating in Vickrey Auctions," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 68(2), pages 257-267, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jnlbus:v:68:y:1995:i:2:p:257-67
    DOI: 10.1086/296663
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Ronald M. Harstad, 2005. "Rational Participation Revolutionizes Auction Theory," Working Papers 0518, Department of Economics, University of Missouri.
    2. Michael H. Rothkopf, 2007. "Thirteen Reasons Why the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Process Is Not Practical," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 55(2), pages 191-197, April.
    3. Ronald M. Harstad & Aleksandar Saša Pekeč, 2008. "Relevance to Practice and Auction Theory: A Memorial Essay for Michael Rothkopf," Interfaces, INFORMS, vol. 38(5), pages 367-380, October.
    4. R. H. Kwon & G. Anandalingam & L. H. Ungar, 2005. "Iterative Combinatorial Auctions with Bidder-Determined Combinations," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 51(3), pages 407-418, March.
    5. Vasilis Syrgkanis & David Kempe & Eva Tardos, 2019. "Information Asymmetries in Common-Value Auctions with Discrete Signals," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 44(4), pages 1450-1476, November.
    6. David Lucking-Reiley, 2000. "Vickrey Auctions in Practice: From Nineteenth-Century Philately to Twenty-First-Century E-Commerce," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 183-192, Summer.
    7. Aleksandar Pekev{c} & Michael H. Rothkopf, 2003. "Combinatorial Auction Design," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 49(11), pages 1485-1503, November.
    8. Ronald M Harstad, 2011. "Endogenous Competition Alters the Structure of Optimal Auctions," ISER Discussion Paper 0816, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    9. G. Anandalingam & Robert W. Day & S. Raghavan, 2005. "The Landscape of Electronic Market Design," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 51(3), pages 316-327, March.
    10. Michael H. Rothkopf & Sunju Park, 2001. "An Elementary Introduction to Auctions," Interfaces, INFORMS, vol. 31(6), pages 83-97, December.
    11. Atanu R. Sinha & Eric A. Greenleaf, 2000. "The Impact of Discrete Bidding and Bidder Aggressiveness on Sellers' Strategies in Open English Auctions: Reserves and Covert Shilling," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 19(3), pages 244-265, May.
    12. Takahiro Watanabe & Takehiko Yamato, 2008. "A choice of auction format in seller cheating: a signaling game analysis," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 36(1), pages 57-80, July.
    13. Lorentziadis, Panos L., 2016. "Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 248(2), pages 347-371.
    14. Sharma, Shashidharan, 2022. "Cheating in Second Price Auctions and Emotional Responses," MPRA Paper 121492, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    15. Schwert, G. William, 1996. "Markup pricing in mergers and acquisitions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 153-192, June.
    16. Michael H. Rothkopf, 2007. "Decision Analysis: The Right Tool for Auctions," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 4(3), pages 167-172, September.
    17. Ahrash Dianat & Mikhail Freer, 2024. "Credibility in second-price auctions: an experimental test," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 27(1), pages 58-79, March.
    18. Robert W. Day & S. Raghavan, 2007. "Fair Payments for Efficient Allocations in Public Sector Combinatorial Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 53(9), pages 1389-1406, September.
    19. Harstad, Ronald M. & Pekec, Aleksandar Sasa & Tsetlin, Ilia, 2008. "Information aggregation in auctions with an unknown number of bidders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 476-508, March.
    20. Kosmopoulou, Georgia & De Silva, Dakshina G., 2007. "The effect of shill bidding upon prices: Experimental evidence," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 291-313, April.

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