Secured Debt under Conditions of Imperfect Information
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DOI: 10.1086/467906
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Cited by:
- Alberto Zazzaro, 2005.
"Should Courts Enforce Credit Contracts Strictly?,"
Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 115(500), pages 166-184, January.
- Alberto ZAZZARO, 2003. "Should Courts Enforce Credit Contracts Strictly ?," Working Papers 181, Universita' Politecnica delle Marche (I), Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali.
- Stanley D. Longhofer & Stephen R. Peters, 2000. "Protection for whom? creditor conflicts in bankruptcy," Working Papers (Old Series) 9909R, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
- Abdul Halim, Zairihan & How, Janice & Verhoeven, Peter, 2017. "Agency costs and corporate sukuk issuance," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 83-95.
- Tarbalouti, Mr, 2010. "Défaut de paiement,Achat de consentement et efficience économique [Default, purchase of consent and economic effeciency]," MPRA Paper 56220, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Edward M. Iacobucci & Ralph A. Winter, 2005. "Asset Securitization and Asymmetric Information," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(1), pages 161-206, January.
- Clas Bergström & Theodore Eisenberg & Stefan Sundgren, 2004. "On the Design of Efficient Priority Rules for Secured Creditors: Empirical Evidence from A Change in Law," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 273-297, December.
- Edward R. Morrison, 2009. "Bargaining around Bankruptcy: Small Business Workouts and State Law," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 38(2), pages 255-307, June.
- John Armour, 2006. "Should we redistribute in insolvency," Working Papers wp319, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.
- van 't Veld, Klaas T. & Rausser, Gordon C. & Simon, Leo K., 2000. "Fitting the glass slipper: optimal capital structure in the face of liability," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt5nb497vk, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
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