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Deterrence, Contagion, and Legitimacy in Anticorruption Policy Making: An Experimental Analysis

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  • Amadou Boly
  • Robert Gillanders
  • Topi Miettinen

Abstract

In our framed laboratory experiment, two public officials, A and B, make consecutive decisions regarding embezzlement from separate funds. Official B observes official A’s decisions before making his or her own. We find a contagion effect of embezzlement in that facing a corrupt official A increases the likelihood of embezzlement by official B. Likewise, deterrence matters in that higher detection probabilities significantly decrease the likelihood of embezzlement. Crucially, when the same deterrence policy applies to both officials, detection is more effective in curbing embezzlement if chosen by an honest public official A rather than a corrupt public official A. This legitimacy effect may help explain why anticorruption policies can fail in countries where the government is believed (or known) to be corrupt.

Suggested Citation

  • Amadou Boly & Robert Gillanders & Topi Miettinen, 2019. "Deterrence, Contagion, and Legitimacy in Anticorruption Policy Making: An Experimental Analysis," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 48(2), pages 275-305.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlstud:doi:10.1086/703128
    DOI: 10.1086/703128
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Banerjee, Ritwik & Boly, Amadou & Gillanders, Robert, 2022. "Anti-tax evasion, anti-corruption and public good provision: An experimental analysis of policy spillovers," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 197(C), pages 179-194.
    2. Dincer, Oguzhan & Gillanders, Robert, 2021. "Shelter in place? Depends on the place: Corruption and social distancing in American states," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 269(C).
    3. Gillanders, Robert & van der Werff, Lisa, 2020. "Corruption Experiences and Attitudes to Political, Interpersonal, and Domestic Violence," MPRA Paper 99949, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Chian Jones Ritten & Christopher Bastian & Owen Phillips, 2021. "The relative effectiveness of law enforcement policies aimed at reducing illegal trade: Evidence from laboratory markets," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 16(11), pages 1-20, November.
    5. Bahník, Štěpán & Vranka, Marek Albert, 2020. "Experimental test of the effects of punishment probability and size on the decision to take a bribe," OSF Preprints cfwvj, Center for Open Science.
    6. Shuguang Jiang & Marie Claire Villeval, 2022. "Dishonesty in Developing Countries -What Can We Learn From Experiments?," Working Papers hal-03899654, HAL.
    7. Levati, M. Vittoria & Nardi, Chiara, 2023. "Letting third parties who suffer from petty corruption talk: Evidence from a collusive bribery experiment," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 76(C).
    8. Bahník, Štěpán & Vranka, Marek A., 2022. "Experimental test of the effects of punishment probability and size on the decision to take a bribe," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 97(C).

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