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Legal Centralization: A Tocquevillian View

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  • Bertrand Crettez
  • Bruno Deffains
  • Olivier Musy

Abstract

We study the degree of legal centralization in a setting in which people are averse to inequality before the law. In this approach inspired by Tocqueville, the degree of legal centralization is determined by striking a balance between equality before the law and attention to local needs. We show that there is a threshold such that when the intensity of aversion to inequality before the law is below this threshold, legal decentralization is preferred to legal centralization (and the converse is true). We also show that the optimal way to balance the desire for local adjustments and national uniformity is not an intermediate degree of centralization but nationally uniform rules that can be adapted by judges. We rely on these results to provide an analytical narrative to the abrupt change from legal diversity to full legal centralization and uniformization around the time of the French Revolution in 1789.

Suggested Citation

  • Bertrand Crettez & Bruno Deffains & Olivier Musy, 2018. "Legal Centralization: A Tocquevillian View," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 47(2), pages 295-323.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlstud:doi:10.1086/698860
    DOI: 10.1086/698860
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    Cited by:

    1. Crettez, Bertrand & Deffains, Bruno & Musy, Olivier & Tallec, Ronan, 2020. "State Capacity, Legal Design and the Venality of Judicial Offices," MPRA Paper 105009, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Jaaidane, Touria & Musy, Olivier & Tallec, Ronan, 2022. "Rent-seeking, Reform and Conflict: French Parliaments at the End of the Ancien Régime," MPRA Paper 112067, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Joseph Warren, 2024. "How the structure of legal authority affects political inequality," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 35(2), pages 151-173, June.
    4. Barriola, Illan & Deffains, Bruno & Musy, Olivier, 2023. "Law and inequality: A comparative approach to the distributive implications of legal systems," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
    5. Bertrand Crettez & Bruno Deffains & Olivier Musy & Ronan Tallec, 2024. "Judicial Venality: A Rational Choice Analysis," Working Papers AFED 24-05, Association Francaise d'Economie du Droit (AFED).

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