Patent Pools as a Solution to Efficient Licensing of Complementary Patents? Some Experimental Evidence
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DOI: 10.1086/600078
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- Jay Pil Choi & Heiko Gerlach, 2015.
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RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(3), pages 499-523, September.
- Jay Pil Choi & Heiko Gerlach, 2013. "Patent Pools, Litigation and Innovation," CESifo Working Paper Series 4429, CESifo.
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