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Decreasing Average Cost and Competition: A New Look at the Addyston Pipe Case

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  • Bittlingmayer, George

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  • Bittlingmayer, George, 1982. "Decreasing Average Cost and Competition: A New Look at the Addyston Pipe Case," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25(2), pages 201-229, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:v:25:y:1982:i:2:p:201-29
    DOI: 10.1086/467013
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    Cited by:

    1. Karen Clay & Werner Troesken & Michael Haines, 2014. "Lead and Mortality," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 96(3), pages 458-470, July.
    2. Dennis Mueller, 1996. "Antimerger policy in the United States: History and lessons," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 23(3), pages 229-253, October.
    3. Rau, Philipp & Spinler, Stefan, 2017. "Alliance formation in a cooperative container shipping game: Performance of a real options investment approach," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 155-175.
    4. Button, Kenneth, 2005. "How Stable are Scheduled Air Transport Markets," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 27-48, January.
    5. Donald Dewey, 1984. "What Price Theory Can—And Cannot—Do For Antitrust," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 3(2), pages 3-11, December.
    6. Mueller, Dennis C., 1996. "Lessons from the United States's antitrust history," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 415-445, June.
    7. Keith Jakee & Leonie Allen, 1998. "Destructive Competition or Competition Destroyed? Regulatory Theory and the History of Irish Road Transportation Legislation," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 13-50, January.
    8. Dwight R. Lee & Richard B. McKenzie, 1998. "How the Client Effect Moderates Price Competition," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 64(3), pages 741-752, January.
    9. Kumar, Vikram & Marshall, Robert C. & Marx, Leslie M. & Samkharadze, Lily, 2015. "Buyer resistance for cartel versus merger," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 71-80.
    10. Werner Troesken, 2010. "Lead, Mortality, and Productivity," Working Paper 424, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, revised Jan 2010.
    11. Michael A. Williams, 1986. "An Economic Application of Bootstrap Statistical Methods: Addyston Pipe Revisited," The American Economist, Sage Publications, vol. 30(2), pages 52-58, October.
    12. Kenneth Button & Peter Nijkamp, 1997. "Network Industries, Economic Stability and Spatial Integration," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 97-047/3, Tinbergen Institute.
    13. Iwan Bos & Erik Pot, 2012. "On the possibility of welfare-enhancing hard core cartels," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 107(3), pages 199-216, November.
    14. Button, Kenneth, 2003. "Does the theory of the ‘core’ explain why airlines fail to cover their long-run costs of capital?," Journal of Air Transport Management, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 5-14.
    15. Taylor Jason E, 2010. "The Welfare Impact of Collusion under Various Industry Characteristics: A Panel Examination of Efficient Cartel Theory," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-29, October.

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