The Evolution of U.S. Cartel Enforcement
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DOI: 10.1086/676070
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Cited by:
- Robert M. Feinberg & Kara M. Reynolds, 2024. "State-Level Antitrust Enforcement: Revisiting the Determinants," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 65(3), pages 793-806, November.
- Thomas Bourveau & Guoman She & Alminas Žaldokas, 2020. "Corporate Disclosure as a Tacit Coordination Mechanism: Evidence from Cartel Enforcement Regulations," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(2), pages 295-332, May.
- Robert M. Feinberg, 2023. "Patterns and Determinants of Canadian Anti-Cartel and Antidumping Policy: 1990–2019," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 23(3), pages 309-327, December.
- Vivek Ghosal & D. Daniel Sokol, 2016.
"Policy Innovations, Political Preferences, and Cartel Prosecutions,"
Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 48(4), pages 405-432, June.
- Vivek Ghosal & D. Daniel Sokol, 2015. "Policy Innovations, Political Preferences, and Cartel Prosecutions," CESifo Working Paper Series 5543, CESifo.
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