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Is a Higher Calling Enough? Incentive Compensation in the Church

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  • Jay C. Hartzell
  • Christopher A. Parsons
  • David L. Yermack

Abstract

We study the compensation and productivity of more than 2,000 Methodist ministers in a 43-year panel data set. The church appears to use pay-for-performance incentives for its clergy, as their compensation follows a sharing rule by which pastors receive approximately 3% of the incremental revenue from membership increases. Ministers receive the strongest rewards for attracting new parishioners who switch from other congregations within their denomination. Monetary incentives are weaker in settings where ministers have less control over their measured performance. (c) 2010 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.

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  • Jay C. Hartzell & Christopher A. Parsons & David L. Yermack, 2010. "Is a Higher Calling Enough? Incentive Compensation in the Church," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(3), pages 509-539, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlabec:v:28:y:2010:i:3:p:509-539
    DOI: 10.1086/652461
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. Gianandrea Lanzara & Sara Lazzaroni & Paolo Masella & Mara P. Squicciarini, 2023. "Do Bishops Matter for Politics? Evidence From Italy," Working Papers wp1179, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.

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