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Fixing the Patent Office

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  • Mark A. Lemley

Abstract

Executive SummaryHow can we allow patent examiners to effectively distinguish between patentable and unpatentable inventions without slowing the process to a crawl or wasting a bunch of money? This essay reviews the recent literature and considers a number of proposals and their limitations. It concludes that the system can be improved but that we are unlikely to solve the problem of bad patents altogether. The focus in reform discussions should be on understanding and changing applicant and examiner incentives rather than simply spending money.

Suggested Citation

  • Mark A. Lemley, 2013. "Fixing the Patent Office," Innovation Policy and the Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 13(1), pages 83-100.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:ipolec:doi:10.1086/668240
    DOI: 10.1086/668240
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Marc Baudry & Béatrice Dumont, 2006. "Patent Renewals as Options: Improving the Mechanism for Weeding Out Lousy Patents," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 28(1), pages 41-62, February.
    2. Graham, Stuart J.H. & Hall, Bronwyn H. & Harhoff, Dietmar & Mowery, David C., 2002. "Post-Issue Patent “Quality Control:” A Comparative Study of US Patent Re-examinations and European Patent Oppositions," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt7931q79x, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
    3. Catherine Tucker, 2012. "Patent Trolls and Technology Diffusion," NBER Chapters, in: Standards, Patents and Innovations, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, 2008. "Introduction to Patent Failure: How Judges, Bureaucrats, and Lawyers Put Innovators at Risk," Introductory Chapters, in: Patent Failure: How Judges, Bureaucrats, and Lawyers Put Innovators at Risk, Princeton University Press.
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    Cited by:

    1. Schankerman, Mark & Schuett, Florian, 2016. "Screening for Patent Quality," CEPR Discussion Papers 11688, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Schankerman, Mark & Schütt, Florian, 2016. "Screening for Patent Quality : Examination, Fees, and the Courts," Other publications TiSEM e9210a8e-ff3b-4f03-823b-a, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    3. Raffiee, Joseph & Teodoridis, Florenta & Fehder, Daniel, 2023. "Partisan patent examiners? Exploring the link between the political ideology of patent examiners and patent office outcomes," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 52(9).
    4. Neil Gandal & Michal Shur-Ofry & Michael Crystal & Royee Shilony, 2021. "Out of sight: patents that have never been cited," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 126(4), pages 2903-2929, April.

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