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Ownership and Control in Mexico's Community Forestry Sector

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  • Camille Antinori
  • Gordon C. Rausser

Abstract

Ownership and control are rarely synonymous. This article examines the factors motivating Mexican agrarian communities with forests to participate and invest in timber production activities, an opportunity that has opened in the past 20 years due to changes in Mexican forestry policy. We propose that contractual difficulties with downstream production services and buyers led community members to forward integrate into the wood production industry to enjoy greater benefits from production. An incomplete contracting model frames our analysis while original community-level data from Oaxaca, Mexico, serves as the basis for empirical quantification. Using measures of specificity of investments, uncertainty, multiple uses of the forest, and managerial and labor expertise, it is found that communities with higher levels of human, social, and resource capital endowments are more likely to integrate forward into timber-processing activities. (c) 2008 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.

Suggested Citation

  • Camille Antinori & Gordon C. Rausser, 2008. "Ownership and Control in Mexico's Community Forestry Sector," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 57(1), pages 101-136, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:ecdecc:v:57:y:2008:i:1:p:101-136
    DOI: 10.1086/590459
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Gelo, Dambala, 2020. "Forest commons, vertical integration and smallholder’s saving and investment responses: Evidence from a quasi-experiment," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 132(C).
    2. Juan Regino Maldonado & Wen Yali & Frederick Cubbage & Patricia Regino Maldonado, 2017. "Forest Resources in the Performance of Mexican Community Forest Enterprises in a Vertical Integration System," International Journal of Sciences, Office ijSciences, vol. 6(09), pages 1-15, September.
    3. Vítor João Pereira Domingues Martinho & António José Dinis Ferreira, 2020. "Forest Resources Management and Sustainability: The Specific Case of European Union Countries," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(1), pages 1-21, December.
    4. Antinori, Camille M. & Rausser, Gordon C., 2010. "The Mexican Common Property Forestry Sector," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt8qh479p8, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
    5. Torres-Rojo, Juan Manuel & Moreno-Sánchez, Rafael & Amador-Callejas, Joel, 2019. "Effect of capacity building in alleviating poverty and improving forest conservation in the communal forests of Mexico," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 108-122.
    6. Gelo, Dambala & Dikgang, Johane, 2019. "Collective action and heterogeneous welfare effects: Evidence from Ethiopian villages," World Development Perspectives, Elsevier, vol. 16(C).
    7. Carias Vega, Dora & Keenan, Rodney J., 2016. "Transaction costs and the organization of CFEs: Experiences from ejidos in Quintana Roo, Mexico," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 1-8.
    8. Carías Vega, Dora E. & Keenan, Rodney J., 2016. "Situating community forestry enterprises within New Institutional Economic theory: What are the implications for their organization?," Journal of Forest Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 1-13.

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