Local Politics, Political Institutions, and Public Resource Allocation
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DOI: 10.1086/664020
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- Victoire GIRARD, 2017. "Stabbed in the back: Does sabotage follow mandated political representation?," LEO Working Papers / DR LEO 2544, Orleans Economics Laboratory / Laboratoire d'Economie d'Orleans (LEO), University of Orleans.
- Victoire Girard, 2021.
"Stabbed in the back? Mandated political representation and murders,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 56(4), pages 595-634, May.
- Victoire Girard, 2020. "Stabbed in the back? Mandated political representation and murders," NOVAFRICA Working Paper Series wp2005, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Nova School of Business and Economics, NOVAFRICA.
- Victoire Girard, 2021. "Stabbed in the back? Mandated political representation and murders," Post-Print hal-03557730, HAL.
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