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The Internal Distribution of Union Rents: An Empirical Test of the Voting Power Model

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  • Parsons, Donald O

Abstract

The egalitarian wage policies of labor unions in the United States have been attributed to low-skilled majorities pursuing their self-interest in a majority rule environment. For this hypothesis to be more than a formalization of stylized facts requires evidence that unions are not egalitarian when the work place is not characterized.by a low-skilled majority. The author considers the impact of high-skilled majorities on (1) voting behavior in certification elections and (2) rent distribution policies in existing unions. Neither analysis supports the belief that union rent distribution policies are driven by skill-group coalitions pursuing their self-interests. Copyright 1992 by MIT Press.

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  • Parsons, Donald O, 1992. "The Internal Distribution of Union Rents: An Empirical Test of the Voting Power Model," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 74(3), pages 439-445, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:tpr:restat:v:74:y:1992:i:3:p:439-45
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    Cited by:

    1. Johnny Ducking & Peter A. Groothuis & James Richard Hill, 2014. "Minimum Pay Scale and Career Length in the NBA," Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(4), pages 617-635, October.
    2. Johan Stennek, 2020. "Why Unions Reduce Wage Inequality: A Theory of Domino Effects," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 122(3), pages 1045-1072, July.
    3. J. Richard Hill & Peter A. Groothuis, 2001. "The New NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement, the Median Voter Model, and a Robin Hood Rent Redistribution," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 2(2), pages 131-144, May.

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