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Competitive Bidding under Asymmetrical Information: Behavior and Performance in Gulf of Mexico Drainage Lease Sales, 1959-1969

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  • Mead, Walter J
  • Moseidjord, Asbjorn
  • Sorensen, Philip E

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Suggested Citation

  • Mead, Walter J & Moseidjord, Asbjorn & Sorensen, Philip E, 1984. "Competitive Bidding under Asymmetrical Information: Behavior and Performance in Gulf of Mexico Drainage Lease Sales, 1959-1969," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 66(3), pages 505-508, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:tpr:restat:v:66:y:1984:i:3:p:505-08
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    Cited by:

    1. Levitt, Clinton J., 2016. "Information spillovers in onshore oil and gas exploration," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 80-98.
    2. Christopher J. Meyer, 1993. "Assessing the performance of real estate auctions," Working Papers 93-1, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
    3. Winter, Jennifer L., 2010. "Buying Anonymity: An Investigation of Petroleum and Natural Gas Lease Auctions," MPRA Paper 35560, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Dec 2011.
    4. Iledare, Omowumi O. & Pulsipher, Allan G. & Olatubi, Williams O. & Mesyanzhinov, Dmitry V., 2004. "An empirical analysis of the determinants of high bonus bids for petroleum leases in the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf (OCS)," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 239-259, March.
    5. McClellan, Andrew, 2023. "Knowing your opponents: Information disclosure and auction design," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 173-180.
    6. Virag, Gabor, 2007. "Repeated common value auctions with asymmetric bidders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 156-177, October.
    7. Marco Casari & Christine Jackson & Jingjing Zhang, 2009. "Do Groups Fall Prey to the Winner's Curse?," Department of Economics Working Papers 2009-18, McMaster University.

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