IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/tpr/glenvp/v3y2003i4p1-23.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Persistence of the Kyoto Protocol: Why Other Annex I Countries Move on Without the United States

Author

Listed:
  • Jon Hovi
  • Tora Skodvin
  • Steinar Andresen

Abstract

The United States, the world's largest emitter of greenhouse gases, is not going to ratify the Kyoto Protocol in the foreseeable future. Yet, a number of countries have decided to stay on the Kyoto track. Four main explanations for this apparent puzzle are considered. The first is that remaining Annex I countries still expect the Kyoto Protocol to reduce global warming sufficiently to outweigh the economic costs of implementation. The second is that the parties, by implementing the treaty, hope to induce non-parties to follow suit at some later stage. A third hypothesis is that EU climate institutions have generated a momentum that has made a change of course difficult. Finally, Kyoto's persistence may be linked to the European Union's desire to stand forth as an international leader in the field of climate politics. We conclude that the first two explanations have little explanatory power, but find the latter two more promising. Copyright (c) 2004 Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Suggested Citation

  • Jon Hovi & Tora Skodvin & Steinar Andresen, 2003. "The Persistence of the Kyoto Protocol: Why Other Annex I Countries Move on Without the United States," Global Environmental Politics, MIT Press, vol. 3(4), pages 1-23, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:tpr:glenvp:v:3:y:2003:i:4:p:1-23
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1162/152638003322757907
    File Function: link to full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Wolfgang Buchholz & Wolfgang Peters, 2005. "A Rawlsian Approach to International Cooperation," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(1), pages 25-44, February.
    2. Steinar Andresen, 2007. "Key actors in UN environmental governance: influence, reform and leadership," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 7(4), pages 457-468, December.
    3. Linda M. Young & Alfons Weersink & Murray Fulton & B. James Deaton, 2007. "Carbon Sequestration in Agriculture: EU and US Perspectives La séquestration du carbone en agriculture: perspectives pour l'Europe et les Etats Unis CO2‐Sequestrierung in der Landwirtschaft: Perspekti," EuroChoices, The Agricultural Economics Society, vol. 6(1), pages 32-37, April.
    4. Patrick Criqui & Denise Cavard, 2004. "Economic approach to climate policies and stakes of international negotiations," Post-Print halshs-00003793, HAL.
    5. Hiroki Iwata & Keisuke Okada, 2014. "Greenhouse gas emissions and the role of the Kyoto Protocol," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 16(4), pages 325-342, October.
    6. Christopher Pallas & Johannes Urpelainen, 2012. "NGO monitoring and the legitimacy of international cooperation: A strategic analysis," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 1-32, March.
    7. Johannes Urpelainen, 2013. "A model of dynamic climate governance: dream big, win small," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 107-125, May.
    8. Jon Hovi & Bjart Holtsmark, 2006. "Cap-and-trade or carbon taxes? The feasibility of enforcement and the effects of non-compliance," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 137-155, June.
    9. Thomas Hale & Johannes Urpelainen, 2015. "When and how can unilateral policies promote the international diffusion of environmental policies and clean technology?," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 27(2), pages 177-205, April.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:tpr:glenvp:v:3:y:2003:i:4:p:1-23. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: The MIT Press (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://direct.mit.edu/journals .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.