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Deterministic equations for stochastic spatial evolutionary games

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  • ,

    (Department of Mathematics and Statistics, University of Massachusetts at Amherst)

  • Katsoulakis, Markos

    (Department of Mathematics and Statistics, University of Massachusetts at Amherst)

  • ,

    (Department of Mathematics and Statistics, University of Massachusetts at Amherst)

Abstract

Spatial evolutionary games model individuals who are distributed in a spatial domain and update their strategies upon playing a normal form game with their neighbors. We derive integro-differential equations as deterministic approximations of the microscopic updating stochastic processes. This generalizes the known mean-field ordinary differential equations and provide a powerful tool to investigate the spatial effects in populations evolution. The deterministic equations allow to identify many interesting features of the evolution of strategy profiles in a population, such as standing and traveling waves, and pattern formation, especially in replicator-type evolutions.

Suggested Citation

  • , & Katsoulakis, Markos & ,, 2013. "Deterministic equations for stochastic spatial evolutionary games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(3), September.
    • Handle: RePEc:the:publsh:829
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Sandholm, William H., 2015. "Population Games and Deterministic Evolutionary Dynamics," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Evolutionary games; mean-field interactions; deterministic approximation; Kac potentials; pattern formation; traveling wave solutions;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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