"Calibeating": beating forecasters at their own game
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- Dean P. Foster & Sergiu Hart, 2022. ""Calibeating": Beating Forecasters at Their Own Game," Papers 2209.04892, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2022.
References listed on IDEAS
- Foster, Dean & Hart, Sergiu, 2023.
""Calibeating": beating forecasters at their own game,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(4), November.
- Dean P. Foster & Sergiu Hart, 2022. ""Calibeating": Beating Forecasters at Their Own Game," Papers 2209.04892, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2022.
- Dean P. Foster & Sergiu Hart, 2021.
"Forecast Hedging and Calibration,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 129(12), pages 3447-3490.
- Sergiu Hart & Dean P. Foster, 2019. "Forecast-Hedging and Calibration," Discussion Paper Series dp731, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Dean P. Foster & Sergiu Hart, 2022. "Forecast Hedging and Calibration," Papers 2210.07169, arXiv.org.
- Foster, Dean P., 1999.
"A Proof of Calibration via Blackwell's Approachability Theorem,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 29(1-2), pages 73-78, October.
- Dean P Foster, 1997. "A proof of Calibration via Blackwell's Approachability Theorem," Levine's Working Paper Archive 591, David K. Levine.
- Dean P. Foster, 1997. "A Proof of Calibration Via Blackwell's Approachability Theorem," Discussion Papers 1182, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Hart, Sergiu, 1992. "Games in extensive and strategic forms," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 2, pages 19-40, Elsevier.
- Foster, Dean P. & Hart, Sergiu, 2018.
"Smooth calibration, leaky forecasts, finite recall, and Nash dynamics,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 271-293.
- Dean P. Foster & Sergiu Hart, 2022. "Smooth Calibration, Leaky Forecasts, Finite Recall, and Nash Dynamics," Papers 2210.07152, arXiv.org.
- Alvaro Sandroni, 2003. "The reproducible properties of correct forecasts," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 32(1), pages 151-159, December.
- ,, 2008. "Many inspections are manipulable," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 3(3), September.
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Cited by:
- Foster, Dean & Hart, Sergiu, 2023.
""Calibeating": beating forecasters at their own game,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(4), November.
- Dean P. Foster & Sergiu Hart, 2022. ""Calibeating": Beating Forecasters at Their Own Game," Papers 2209.04892, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2022.
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More about this item
Keywords
Forecasting; calibration; experts; Brier score; refinement score;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
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