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Equilibrium in a civilized jungle

Author

Listed:
  • Rubinstein, Ariel

    (School of Economics, Tel Aviv Univeristy and Department of Eocnomics, New York University)

  • Yildiz, Kemal

    (Department of Economics, Bilkent University)

Abstract

The jungle model with an equal number of agents and objects is enriched by adding a language, which is a set of orderings over the set of agents. An assignment of an agent to an object is justified within a group of agents if there is an ordering according to which that agent is the best-suited in the group. A civilized equilibrium is an assignment such that every agent is the strongest in the group of agents consisting of himself and those who wish to be assigned to the object and can be justified within this group. We present (i) conditions under which the equilibrium in a civilized jungle is identical to the jungle equilibrium; (ii) a connection between the power relation and the language that is essentially necessary and sufficient for the existence of a Pareto efficient civilized equilibrium; and (iii) an analogue to the second welfare theorem.

Suggested Citation

  • Rubinstein, Ariel & Yildiz, Kemal, 2022. "Equilibrium in a civilized jungle," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(3), July.
    • Handle: RePEc:the:publsh:4886
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Anderlini, L. & Felli, L. & Piccone, M., 2022. "The Emergence of Enforcement," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2250, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    2. Mert Kimya, 2024. "Power, Status and the Stability of Hierarchies," Working Papers 2024-04, University of Sydney, School of Economics.
    3. Richter, Michael & Rubinstein, Ariel, 2024. "Unilateral stability in matching problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 216(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Jungle equilibrium; justifiability; civilized equilibrium;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D0 - Microeconomics - - General
    • C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General

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