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Optimal organ allocation policy under blood-type barriers with the donor-priority rule

Author

Listed:
  • Kim, Jaehong

    (The Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics and Department of Economics, School of Economics, Xiamen University)

  • Li, Mengling

    (Department of Economics, School of Economics and The Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics, Xiamen University)

Abstract

Shortages in organs for transplantation have resulted in a renewed interest in designing incentive policies to promote organ supply. The donor-priority rule, which grants priority for transplantation based on deceased organ donor registration status, has proven to be effective in both theory and practice. This study investigates the implications of the donor-priority rule for optimal deceased organ allocation policy design under a general formulation of blood-type barriers. We find that for any blood typing and organ matching technology, reserving type X organs for only type X patients maximizes the aggregate donation rate under regular distributions, which also ensures equity in organ sharing. Moreover, this is the unique optimal allocation policy if and only if the directed compatibility graph that corresponds to a given organ matching technology is acyclic.

Suggested Citation

  • Kim, Jaehong & Li, Mengling, 2022. "Optimal organ allocation policy under blood-type barriers with the donor-priority rule," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(1), January.
    • Handle: RePEc:the:publsh:3969
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    File URL: http://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/viewFile/20220331/33008/960
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    Cited by:

    1. Heo, Eun Jeong & Hong, Sunghoon & Chun, Youngsub, 2022. "Efficient use of immunosuppressants for kidney transplants," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(C).
    2. Li, Mengling & Riyanto, Yohanes E. & Xu, Menghan, 2023. "Prioritized organ allocation rules under compatibility constraints," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 403-427.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Market design; organ donation; priority rule; blood-type compatibility; equity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • H42 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Private Goods
    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets

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