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Nonlinear pricing, market coverage, and competition

Author

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  • ,

    (Department of Economics, Ohio State University)

  • ,

    (Department of Economics, Ohio State University)

Abstract

This paper considers a nonlinear pricing framework with both horizontally and vertically differentiated products. By endogenizing the set of consumers served in the market, we are able to study how increased competition affects nonlinear pricing, in particular the market coverage and quality distortions. We characterize the symmetric equilibrium menu of price-quality offers under different market structures. When the market structure moves from monopoly to duopoly, we show that more types of consumers are served and quality distortions decrease. As the market structure becomes more competitive, the effect of increased competition exhibits some non-monotonic features: when the initial competition is not too weak, a further increase in the number of firms leads to more types of consumers being covered and a reduction in quality distortions; when the initial competition is weak, an increase in the number of firms leads to fewer types of consumers being covered, though the effect on quality distortions is not uniform.

Suggested Citation

  • , & ,, 2008. "Nonlinear pricing, market coverage, and competition," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 3(1), March.
    • Handle: RePEc:the:publsh:336
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    Cited by:

    1. Alderighi, Marco & Cento, Alessandro & Nijkamp, Peter & Rietveld, Piet, 2012. "Competition in the European aviation market: the entry of low-cost airlines," Journal of Transport Geography, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 223-233.
    2. Eugenio Miravete, 2014. "Testing for complementarities among countable strategies," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 46(4), pages 1521-1544, June.
    3. George Deltas & Thanasis Stengos & Eleftherios Zacharias, 2011. "Product line pricing in a vertically differentiated oligopoly," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 44(3), pages 907-929, August.
    4. Thiago Cacicedo, 2021. "Price discrimination and market concentration: Evidence from the laundry detergent market," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 89(6), pages 594-609, December.
    5. Mark Armstrong, 2016. "Nonlinear Pricing," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 8(1), pages 583-614, October.
    6. Daeyoung Jeong, 2019. "Job market signaling with imperfect competition among employers," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(4), pages 1139-1167, December.
    7. Stephen Davies, Catherine Waddams Price, and Chris M. Wilson, 2014. "Nonlinear Pricing and Tariff Differentiation: Evidence from the British Electricity Market," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 1).
    8. Gihwan Yi & Min Kim & Hoe Sang Chung, 2024. "The Revenue Impact of Differential Seat Pricing and Competition in the Movie Theater Market," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 64(3), pages 361-382, May.
    9. Ron Borzekowski & Raphael Thomadsen & Charles Taragin, 2009. "Competition and price discrimination in the market for mailing lists," Quantitative Marketing and Economics (QME), Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 147-179, June.
    10. Daniel F Garrett & Renato Gomes & Lucas Maestri, 2019. "Competitive Screening Under Heterogeneous Information," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 86(4), pages 1590-1630.
    11. Jian Shen & Huanxing Yang & Lixin Ye, 2016. "Competitive Nonlinear Pricing and Contract Variety," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 64(1), pages 64-108, March.
    12. Monteiro, Paulo K. & Page Jr., Frank H., 2009. "Endogenous mechanisms and Nash equilibrium in competitive contracting games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(9-10), pages 664-678, September.
    13. Bonatti, Alessandro, 2011. "Brand-specific tastes for quality," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(5), pages 562-575, September.
    14. Marco Alderighi & Alessandro Cento & Peter Nijkamp & Piet Rietveld, 2011. "Second-degree Price Discrimination and Inter-group Effects in Airline Routes between European Cities," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 11-118/3, Tinbergen Institute.
    15. Adarsh Anand & Mohini Agarwal & Gunjan Bansal & A. H. S. Garmabaki, 2016. "Studying product diffusion based on market coverage," Journal of Marketing Analytics, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 4(4), pages 135-146, December.
    16. Schlereth, Christian & Skiera, Bernd, 2012. "Measurement of consumer preferences for bucket pricing plans with different service attributes," International Journal of Research in Marketing, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 167-180.
    17. Ye, Lixin & Zhang, Chenglin, 2017. "Monopolistic nonlinear pricing with consumer entry," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(1), January.
    18. Marvel, Howard P. & Yang, Huanxing, 2008. "Group purchasing, nonlinear tariffs, and oligopoly," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(5), pages 1090-1105, September.
    19. Miravete, Eugenio, 2009. "Multivariate Sarmanov Count Data Models," CEPR Discussion Papers 7463, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Nonlinear pricing; product differentiation; market coverage; quality distortions;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - General
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General

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