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Experimentation in Organizations

Author

Listed:
  • Moroni, Sofia

    (School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University)

Abstract

We consider a moral hazard problem in which a principal provides incentives to a team of agents to work on a risky project. The project consists of two milestones of unknown feasibility. While working unsuccessfully, the agents’ private beliefs regarding the feasibility of the project decline. This learning requires the principal to provide rents to prevent the agents from procrastinating and free-riding on others’ discoveries. To reduce these rents the principal stops the project inefficiently early and gives identical agents asymmetric experimentation assignments. The principal prefers to reward agents with better future contract terms or task assignments rather than monetary bonuses.

Suggested Citation

  • Moroni, Sofia, 2022. "Experimentation in Organizations," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(3), July.
    • Handle: RePEc:the:publsh:3069
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    File URL: http://econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/article/viewFile/20221403/34334/1022
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Achim, Peter, 2024. "Innovation through competitive experimentation," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(C).
    2. Christoph Carnehl & Marco Ottaviani & Justus Preusser, 2024. "Designing Scientific Grants," Papers 2410.12356, arXiv.org.
    3. Christoph Carnehl & Marco Ottaviani & Justus Preusser, 2024. "Designing Scientific Grants," NBER Chapters, in: Entrepreneurship and Innovation Policy and the Economy, volume 4, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Rodivilov, Alexander, 2022. "Monitoring innovation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 297-326.
    5. Okat, Deniz & Nash, John G.F., 2024. "Delegating trial and error," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 217(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Principal-agent; moral hazard; experimentation; exponential bandit; contests;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law

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