Strategy-proof tie-breaking in matching with priorities
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Cited by:
- Gu, Yu & Zhang, Yongchao, 2024. "On two mechanisms in job rotation problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(C).
- Han, Xiang, 2024. "On the efficiency and fairness of deferred acceptance with single tie-breaking," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 218(C).
- Ayoade, Nickesha & Pápai, Szilvia, 2023.
"School choice with preference rank classes,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 317-341.
- Nickesha Ayoade & Szilvia Pápai, 2020. "School Choice with Preference Rank Classes," Working Papers 20002, Concordia University, Department of Economics.
- Yu, Jingsheng & Zhang, Jun, 2020. "A market design approach to job rotation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 180-192.
- Kloosterman, Andrew & Troyan, Peter, 2020. "School choice with asymmetric information: priority design and the curse of acceptance," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(3), July.
- Westkamp, Alexander, 0. "Tâtonnement in matching markets," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
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Keywords
Weak priorities; stability; constrained efficiency; strategy-proofness;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- I20 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - General
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