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Modelling and strategy consensus for a class of networked evolutionary games

Author

Listed:
  • Guodong Zhao
  • Haitao Li
  • Weiwei Sun
  • Fuad E. Alsaadi

Abstract

Using the semi-tensor product method, this paper investigates the algebraic formulation and strategy consensus for a class of networked evolutionary games (NEGs) with ‘unconditional imitation updating rule’, and presents a number of new results. First, the given NEG is converted to an algebraic form via the semi-tensor product method, and an algorithm is established to obtain the algebraic expression of the considered game. Second, based on the algebraic form, the behaviours of the players in the given evolutionary games are analysed, and some meaningful results are presented. Finally, the strategy consensus problem is considered by adding a pseudo-player to the game, and a free-type control sequence is designed to make the given NEG reach strategy consensus. The study of an illustrative example shows that the new results obtained in this paper work very well.

Suggested Citation

  • Guodong Zhao & Haitao Li & Weiwei Sun & Fuad E. Alsaadi, 2018. "Modelling and strategy consensus for a class of networked evolutionary games," International Journal of Systems Science, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 49(12), pages 2548-2557, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:tsysxx:v:49:y:2018:i:12:p:2548-2557
    DOI: 10.1080/00207721.2018.1506063
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    Cited by:

    1. Guo, Peilian & Han, Changda, 2021. "Nash equilibrium and group strategy consensus of networked evolutionary game with coupled social groups," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 409(C).
    2. Xinrong Yang & Zhenping Geng & Haitao Li, 2023. "Matrix-Based Method for the Analysis and Control of Networked Evolutionary Games: A Survey," Games, MDPI, vol. 14(2), pages 1-13, February.

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