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The value of buyback contract under price competition

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  • Weili Xue
  • Yulin Hu
  • Zhiyuan Chen

Abstract

We investigate the value of buyback contract by analysing a supply chain with one manufacturer and two competing retailers. Three scenarios, depending on whether buyback contracts are offered to neither, one, or both of the retailers, are considered. We first study the case when the manufacturer can only determine his buyback price. We show how the demand uncertainty, the competition level and the handling cost of buyback contract influence the profits of the manufacturer, the two retailers and the whole supply chain. Interestingly, contrary to the conventional wisdom that the buyback contract may intensify competition between the retailers, we show that offering the buyback contract to two competing retailers can benefit every channel member even if the competition level is high. Next, we study the return contract, a special type of buyback contract, and show the effect of competition level and industry outlook on supply chain parties' choices on return contract. We extend Padmanabhan and Png [1997. “Manufacturer's Returns Policies And Retail Competition.” Marketing Science 16 (1): 81–94] to the case with an asymmetric contract structure, i.e. one return contract and one whole-sale contract. We show that an asymmetric contract structure may better off both the retailers and the whole supply chain.

Suggested Citation

  • Weili Xue & Yulin Hu & Zhiyuan Chen, 2019. "The value of buyback contract under price competition," International Journal of Production Research, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 57(9), pages 2679-2694, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:tprsxx:v:57:y:2019:i:9:p:2679-2694
    DOI: 10.1080/00207543.2018.1544425
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    Cited by:

    1. Sharifi, Rozhin & Razavi, Hamideh & Elahi, Ehsan, 2023. "Investigation of the ordering behavior of a retailer in the revenue sharing and buyback contracts considering round number bias," Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    2. Zhen Zhang & Songtao Zhang & Mingshi Yue, 2021. "Joint pricing and replenishment policies for risk‐averse retailers under duopolistic competition," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 42(7), pages 1849-1864, October.
    3. Zhu, Xiaoliang & Guo, Zixue & Yang, Guoqing, 2023. "Credit coguarantee loan buyback contracts: Equilibrium and coordination strategies," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 262(C).
    4. Gaidi Tian & Chunfa Li, 2023. "How Can We Promote Smartphone Leasing via a Buyback Program?," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(14), pages 1-29, July.
    5. Wensi Zhang & Jing Xiao & Lingfei Cai, 2020. "Joint Emission Reduction Strategy in Green Supply Chain under Environmental Regulation," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(8), pages 1-24, April.

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