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Credible commitment in carbon policy

Author

Listed:
  • Steffen Brunner
  • Christian Flachsland
  • Robert Marschinski

Abstract

In this article the problem of credible commitment in carbon policy is discussed. Investors favour long-term predictability of the policy, but without any external enforcement mechanisms a commitment made by a government can be withdrawn, leading to scepticism and lack of credibility. This results in increased market risks and investment hold-up. Regulatory uncertainty stems from (i) strategic interactions between government and firms, (ii) potential learning about climate damage and abatement cost and (iii) political volatility. Although commitment to future policy encourages private investment, it also imposes costs in the form of reduced flexibility to accommodate new information or preferences. The article reviews devices that may help policy makers raise the level of commitment while also leaving some room for flexible adjustments. In particular, legislation of a long-term governance framework, delegation to an independent carbon agency and securitization of investors' stakes in emission markets offer palliative approaches.

Suggested Citation

  • Steffen Brunner & Christian Flachsland & Robert Marschinski, 2012. "Credible commitment in carbon policy," Climate Policy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(2), pages 255-271, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:tcpoxx:v:12:y:2012:i:2:p:255-271
    DOI: 10.1080/14693062.2011.582327
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Strausz, Roland, 2009. "The political economy of regulatory risk," SFB 649 Discussion Papers 2009-040, Humboldt University Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk.
    2. Alistair Ulph & David Ulph, 2009. "Optimal Climate Change Policies When Governments Cannot Commit," Discussion Paper Series, School of Economics and Finance 200909, School of Economics and Finance, University of St Andrews.
    3. Ulph, Alistair & Ulph, David, 2009. "Optimal Climate Change Policies When Governments Cannot Commit," SIRE Discussion Papers 2009-42, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
    4. Alistair Ulph & David Ulph, 2009. "Optimal Climate Change Policies When Governments Cannot Commit," Working Papers 0921, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation.
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