From Merlin to Oz: The strange case of failed lending targets in the UK

As a response to the crisis in the British banking system and reduced lending, the British government established Project Merlin, a series of lending targets aimed at boosting lending to the British economy, and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in particular. Given the economic importance of the targets, however, this paper questions why the Merlin agreements were so ineffective. Three explanations are given: first, in light of the challenges in accessing wholesale funding for the largest UK-owned banks, there was a lack of capacity and incentive to lend more; second, the lack of decisive intervention by the British state to compel banks to lend was also a determinant; third, though, I argue that boosting actual lending figures was not the primary aim of Project Merlin. Instead, the targets were performative, rather than substantive. I argue that these three explanations have important implications for the varieties of capitalism (VoC) debate and the economic and political economic literature on foreign versus domestic bank ownership. To the first literature, the article explains the degree to which politics underpins the structure of even the UK's purportedly liberal market economy (LME), whilst to the second, it explores the limitations to political control over even domestically-owned banks.