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The 'public interest' agency of international organizations? The case of the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance

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  • Andrew Baker

Abstract

This article seeks to outline and explore some of the conditions necessary for International Organizations (IOs) to perform in a public interest fashion through a case study of the Principles of corporate governance formulated by the OECD. Rather than the more commonly documented pathological and dysfunctional behavioural forms of IOs, the case of the Principles, both in their formulation by the OECD, and in their assessment by the World Bank through the ROSC process, represent an episode of IO agency protecting and promoting a wider public interest. In exercising their agency, IO staff, have made the Principles more agreeable to a wider range of interested parties, giving them a general interest orientation, in accordance with a proceduralist definition of public interest. This case should therefore encourage IPE scholars to consider carefully and systematically the sets of circumstances and conditions, which might be required for IO agency to take more socially useful forms. In the final section, three indicators are identified which might be evaluated in future research into the positive public interest agency of IOs across a range of cases.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrew Baker, 2012. "The 'public interest' agency of international organizations? The case of the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance," Review of International Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 19(3), pages 389-414, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:rripxx:v:19:y:2012:i:3:p:389-414
    DOI: 10.1080/09692290.2011.552789
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Daniel W. Drezner, 2007. "Bringing the Great Powers Back In, from All Politics Is Global: Explaining International Regulatory Regimes," Introductory Chapters, in: All Politics Is Global: Explaining International Regulatory Regimes, Princeton University Press.
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    Cited by:

    1. Simon Pemberton & Janice Morphet, 2014. "The Rescaling of Economic Governance: Insights into the Transitional Territories of England," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 51(11), pages 2354-2370, August.

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