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Delaying the inevitable: A political economy approach to currency defenses and depreciation

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  • Stefanie Walter
  • Thomas Willett

Abstract

When faced with speculative pressure on their currencies, policymakers often delay devaluations by spending billions of dollars in defense of a given exchange rate peg, only to succumb and devalue their currency later on. Using a political economy approach we argue that the interaction of distributional concerns, cognitive limitations, time-consistency problems, and institutional structures can keep governments from implementing the economically optimal policy response. We argue that distributional concerns often lead to a ‘bias’ in favor of currency defense as long as market pressures are mild. The political incentives to initially delay devaluations can be exacerbated by institutions that either increase the size of interest groups vulnerable to depreciation or give policymakers incentives to adopt a short time-horizon. Once market pressure becomes strong, however, the politically salient alternative to not depreciating becomes raising interest rates rather than just running down reserves. This acts as a wake-up call that changes perceptions of the underlying distributional considerations and hence the political trade-off between the costs and benefits of an exchange rate defense. As the coalition of devaluation-proponents grows, the likelihood of a devaluation increases. We illustrate our argument by discussing the salient distributional issues and their interaction with domestic institutions in four brief case studies.

Suggested Citation

  • Stefanie Walter & Thomas Willett, 2012. "Delaying the inevitable: A political economy approach to currency defenses and depreciation," Review of International Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 19(1), pages 114-139.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:rripxx:v:19:y:2012:i:1:p:114-139
    DOI: 10.1080/09692290.2010.514524
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    Cited by:

    1. Puspa D. Amri & Thomas D. Willett, 2017. "Policy Inconsistencies and the Political Economy of Currency Crises," Journal of International Commerce, Economics and Policy (JICEP), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 8(01), pages 1-24, February.
    2. Neven Valev, 2017. "Fear of floating," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 25(1), pages 77-90, January.
    3. Jäger, Kai, 2016. "The Role of Regime Type in the Political Economy of Foreign Reserve Accumulation," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 79-96.
    4. HABIBI, Reza, 2021. "Role Of Early Warning Systems In Predicting The Stock Price Crisis: What We Learnt From Grasshopper And Ants Fable," Studii Financiare (Financial Studies), Centre of Financial and Monetary Research "Victor Slavescu", vol. 25(2), pages 6-20, June.
    5. Willett, Thomas D. & Srisorn, Nancy, 2014. "The political economy of the Euro crisis: Cognitive biases, faulty mental models, and time inconsistency," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 39-54.
    6. Nicolás Oviedo, 2022. "Deficit fiscal y tipo de cambio fijo: racionalizando una combinación insostenible," Young Researchers Working Papers 3, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised Oct 2022.

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