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Pay-for-performance, job attraction, and the prospects of bureaucratic representation in public organizations: evidence from a conjoint experiment

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  • Mogens Jin Pedersen
  • Nathan Favero
  • Joohyung Park

Abstract

Does pay-for-performance – a hotly debated compensation scheme for incentivizing public service efficiency – induce inadvertent heterogeneity in job attraction that is counteracting the prospects of bureaucratic diversity and representation? Using data from a pre-registered conjoint experiment among US residents (n = 1,501), we examine whether pay-for-performance (compared to fixed pay) affects attraction to a public service job differently across race, gender, and age. Contrary to theoretical expectations, we find that pay-for-performance does not diminish attraction to a public service job within or between demographic groups. In fact, we find indications that pay-for-performance may enhance job attractiveness among individuals identifying with minority racial groups.

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  • Mogens Jin Pedersen & Nathan Favero & Joohyung Park, 2025. "Pay-for-performance, job attraction, and the prospects of bureaucratic representation in public organizations: evidence from a conjoint experiment," Public Management Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 27(1), pages 273-296, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:rpxmxx:v:27:y:2025:i:1:p:273-296
    DOI: 10.1080/14719037.2023.2245841
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