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Aumann's and Schelling's Game Theory: The Nobel Prize in Economic Science, 2005

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  • S. Abu Turab Rizvi

Abstract

Robert Aumann and Thomas Schelling won the Nobel Prize in Economic Science in 2005. Their work in game theory shows two different approaches to understanding strategic interaction. Schelling's work on the strategic aspects of negotiations, focal points, and self-command is mathematically informal and is based on experimental and inductive knowledge of players' capabilities. Aumann's work on repeated games and common knowledge is mathematically deductive, and assumes highly rational agents. An exploration of their work allows for a comparison of these two approaches.

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  • S. Abu Turab Rizvi, 2007. "Aumann's and Schelling's Game Theory: The Nobel Prize in Economic Science, 2005," Review of Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 19(3), pages 297-316.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:revpoe:v:19:y:2007:i:3:p:297-316
    DOI: 10.1080/09538250701452990
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Robert J. Aumann, 1995. "Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262011476, December.
    2. R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), 2002. "Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 3, number 3.
    3. Stigler, George J & Becker, Gary S, 1977. "De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 67(2), pages 76-90, March.
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