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Effective demand in a stylised Keynesian model of growth

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  • Keiran Sharpe

Abstract

This paper models an economy which suffers from a coordination failure and lack of effective demand in the long run. Specifically, it shows that an input-output economy, with or without credit rationing, converges to a long-period growth path, but that this path is generally Pareto sub-optimal. Yet, although Keynesian problems extend to the long run, typical Keynesian solutions do not: the government seems generally incapable of sustaining growth by demand management measures. The question as to what the government can do to sustain growth is an open one.

Suggested Citation

  • Keiran Sharpe, 2006. "Effective demand in a stylised Keynesian model of growth," Review of Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 18(2), pages 173-191.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:revpoe:v:18:y:2006:i:2:p:173-191
    DOI: 10.1080/09538250600571353
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    References listed on IDEAS

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